Closing the Book on Jusen: An Account of the Bad Loan Crisis and a New Chapter for Securitization in Japan by Felson, Howard M.
FELSON 07/06/98 9:05 AM
567
Note
CLOSING THE BOOK ON JUSEN: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE BAD LOAN CRISIS AND A
NEW CHAPTER FOR SECURITIZATION IN
JAPAN
HOWARD M. FELSON†
INTRODUCTION
Japan breathed a sigh of relief in 1996, as it finally bid farewell
to the worst recession in its post-war history.1  With the recession
behind it, however, Japan now faces the formidable task of correcting
its severe fiscal deficit while at the same time reforming laws and
markets to stimulate growth and foreign investment.2  This effort is
complicated by the presence of billions of dollars of nonperforming
debt3 held by Japanese banks and nonbank financial institutions,4
including the now-defunct jusen.5
† The author would like to thank Professors James Cox and Stephen Wallenstein, David
Sneider, Esq., at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, and especially Paul Leake, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges for their valuable comments on a draft of this Note.  The author is also
grateful to Steven Schwarcz for his insight and inspiration and Ellen Dunham for her editorial
and managerial assistance throughout the Note Process.
1. See Reluctant to Reform: Japan Must Extract More Growth from Its Fast-Maturing
Economy, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 1997, at 10.
2. See Andrew Pollack, The Question Facing Japan: Can Its Vibrant Engine Ever Be
Restarted?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at C9.
3. Nonperforming debt refers to outstanding loans on which principal and/or interest
payments are delinquent or entirely unrecoverable due to the financial distress or default of the
borrower.  In Japan, loans are deemed bad when they have been overdue for six months,
whereas loans in the United States are deemed bad after only three.  See Jathon Sapsford,
Japan Plans Crackdown on Bad Loans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1997, at A5.  Although this Note
focuses primarily on the nonperforming debt originated by jusen, much of the analysis of the
causes of and potential solutions to the jusen problem is similarly applicable to the non-jusen
bad debt crisis currently plaguing Japan.
4. Nonbank financial institutions include entities such as brokerage and investment
banking firms and real estate finance companies.
5. See Jusen Study Mission to Visit U.S., DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Aug. 26, 1997, at 12
(citing a group of Japanese banking officials established to discuss the resolution of the massive
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Jusen were private, consumer-housing finance corporations.6
The seven major jusen were established in Japan in the 1970s by large
financial institutions, banks, and securities houses with the backing of
the Ministry of Finance (MOF).7  Much like Savings and Loans
(S&Ls) in the United States,8 jusen were created to facilitate private
home purchases through mortgage financing.9  During the “bubble
era”10 of the 1980s, however, jusen departed from the home financing
“irrecoverable” loans amassed by the defunct jusen); see also, e.g., Yoshihiro Fujii, Size of Bank
Woes Reflected in Too-Big-to-Fail Debate, NIKKEI WKLY. (Japan), Apr. 7, 1997, at 7 (“[T]he
entire financial system [of Japan is] staggering under of [sic] massive bad debt . . . .”); Kumi
Matsumara, Mitsuzuka Predicts End to Jusen’s Bad Loans, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 3,
1997, at 1 (viewing the jusen’s bad loans as a “major factor behind the lackluster state of the
[Japanese] economy”); MOF to Help Spur ‘Jusen’ Loan Trade, Securitization, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Jusen
Loan Trade] (“The problem of nonperforming loans at financial institutions is considered to be
an impediment to Japan’s economic recovery.”).
6. See, e.g., Anatomy of the ‘Jusen’ Scandal, WKLY. POST (Japan), ¶ 1 (Feb. 12-18, 1996)
<http://www.weeklypost.com/960212/960212a.htm> [hereinafter Jusen Anatomy] (defining
jusen as “consumer housing finance corporations”); Ken Duck, Now that the Fog Has Lifted:
The Impact of Japan’s Administrative Procedures Law on the Regulation of Industry and
Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1686, 1699 (1996) (referring to jusen as “housing
loan companies”).  But see Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble
Economy, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053, 1068 (1996) (defining jusen as “housing finance banks”).
The distinction between “bank” and “corporation” in defining jusen is largely irrelevant to the
analysis in this Note.  For simplicity, this Note will consider jusen to be non-bank entities.
7. See The Jusen Problem—Its Roots Are Deep and Ugly, WKLY. POST (Japan) (Jan. 29,
1996) <http://www.weeklypost.com/960129/960129a.htm> [hereinafter Ugly Roots]; Robert
Juhl, Jusen Shori: Taxpayers to Pay Bill for Failed Housing Loan Companies (Dec. 22, 1995)
(visited Dec. 29, 1996) <http://www.smn.co.jp/keyword/0064k01e.html>.  The MOF is widely
considered one of the most powerful and respected bureaucracies in Japan.  See Dennis Bower,
An Evaluation of the Proposed Fair Trade in Financial Services Act, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 407, 426 (1995) (and see the sources cited therein).  It acts as the primary supervisory body
over banks and contains “some of the world’s most incorruptible and indefatigable civil
servants.”  DANIEL BURSTEIN, YEN! 197-98 (1988).  The MOF also has responsibility for
making tax policy and managing the national debt.  See Charles Smith, Crisis at the Finance
Ministry, FIN. TIMES (London), July 15, 1997, at 2.
8. Several commentators have made comparisons between the S&L and jusen crises.  See,
e.g., Brian Bremner et al., Rescuing Asia, BUS. WK., Nov. 17, 1997, at 116, 119; Clay Chandler,
Japanese Feel Markets’ Tremors, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1997, at A1; Jathon Sapsford, Japanese
Banks’ Bad Loans Constitute Bigger Burden Than U.S. S&L Debacle, WALL ST. J., June 7,
1995, at A10; Aaron Zitner, S&L Crisis in Japan May Take Wide Toll, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
24, 1997, at A1.  A full discussion of the merits of such analogies is, however, beyond the scope
of this Note.
9. See Ugly Roots, supra note 7; Juhl, supra note 7.
10. During the mid-to-late 1980s, the Japanese financial market experienced a massive
amount of speculative activity, resulting in an unprecedented rise in stock and land prices.  For
an in-depth discussion of the origins and impact of Japan’s bubble economy, see generally
CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: JAPAN’S EXTRAORDINARY SPECULATIVE
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market in search of the higher returns of commercial real estate
development deals.11  Lending to the riskier commercial sector,
including many so-called jiageya,12 may have constituted as much as
80% of jusen portfolios.13  When Japan’s bubble economy burst in
1991, the jusen were saddled with a total of 8.1 trillion yen (then
roughly $81 billion14) of nonperforming loans and other bad debts.15
This debt, coupled with the bad loans of Japan’s commercial banks,
places an enormous strain on the Japanese financial system16 and
must be dealt with expeditiously if Japan is to avoid recession.17
BOOM OF THE 80’S AND THE DRAMATIC BUST OF THE 90’S (1992); Miller, supra note 6, at 1058-
69.
11. See Toshio Aritake, Japan Releases Data on Bad Debts of Troubled Housing Loan
Companies, Banking Daily (BNA), Jan. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus
File; Ugly Roots, supra note 7.
12. Jiageya are real estate brokers who, some say, unscrupulously manipulate land prices
for outrageous profits.  See Jusen Anatomy, supra note 6.
13. See Ugly Roots, supra note 7; see also Aritake, supra note 11 (reporting that many of
the jiageya were associated with yakuza (organized crime)).
14. For all Japanese Yen to U.S. dollar conversions, this Note uses the conversion quoted
in the cited source or, if no conversion was made, it uses the spot rate for a particular date or
the mid-point of a particular month available at <http://www.oanda.com/cgi-bin/ncc> (last
visited Jan. 20, 1998), a currency conversion facility on the World Wide Web.  All monetary
values will be given in U.S. dollars except when otherwise indicated.
15. See Juhl, supra note 7.
16. Bad loans place pressure on the financial system in several ways.  First, banks with
large portfolios of bad loans are viewed as riskier investments and therefore experience higher
costs of obtaining funding.  See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.  Second, international
banks must abide by capital adequacy requirements of the Basle Accord.  See infra notes 146-
48 and accompanying text.  Since nonperforming loans are assets which bring in no new funds,
the bad loans combined with the capital requirements strain the ability of banks to use their
capital to make new profitable investments.  Third, as banks become squeezed for capital, they
can ill afford to provide new credit to borrowers, which has led to a liquidity crisis and a
subsequent increase in corporate bankruptcies.  See Paul Abrahams & Gillian Tett, Tokyo
Markets Face a “Death Spiral,” FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 1997, at 3.  Finally, the general
decline in Japanese stock prices, especially those linked to bad loans, has complicated the bad
loan situation in Japan.  The falling prices further weaken banks’ capital-to-assets ratios
because 45% of unrealized gains are normally treated as capital.  See Abrahams & Tett, supra;
see also infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.  Moreover, one commentator writes that
efforts have been made to artificially prop up the Japanese stock market in anticipation of the
March 31 fiscal year-end at which time banks are required to book gains or losses on stock
portfolios.  See Nicholas D. Kristof, For a Shaky Japanese Economy, the Premier Is a Hesitant
Steward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at A1.
17. See Editorial, Now Is a Good Time to Address Bad Debts: Investor Skepticism
Intensifies Need for Quick Action, NIKKEI WKLY. (Japan), Mar. 24, 1997, at 6 (predicting that if
Japan further delays the resolution of its bad loan crisis, massive capital flight may ensue).
Even though these huge bad loans existed for several years, Japan was able to pull itself out of
recession because the market factored the government’s purported desires to effect meaningful
solutions into its valuation of Japanese stock and real estate prices.  If the anticipated
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Despite the fact that losses from the seven major jusen represent
only a fraction of the total amount of nonperforming loans burdening
Japan,18 the resolution of their bad debt problems has attracted wide
media coverage and the attention of policy makers and the public.19
The government’s liquidation of the seven jusen in 1996, while a
powerful statement of its aggressive efforts to resolve the jusen crisis,
did little to solve the fundamental problem of eliciting repayment by
delinquent borrowers.20  Following the liquidation, the bad loan
situation continues to raise important questions for Japanese
taxpayers in general, and government officials and jusen insiders, in
particular.  Specifically: Who is responsible for the jusen’s pro-
curement of such massive debt; and what is the best approach to
settling the jusen crisis?
This Note briefly addresses the former question, but focuses
primarily on the latter, proposing that the securitization21 of
nonperforming assets, such as commercial mortgages and real estate
government action is not taken, however, a resulting sell-off of Japanese assets could
potentially plunge Japan back into recession or at a minimum stunt desired economic growth.
See id.
18. See Jon Choy, Tokyo Marshals Forces Against Nonperforming Loans, JEI Rep. (Japan
Econ. Inst. of Am.), Sep. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File [hereinafter
Choy, Marshaling Forces] (noting that the sheer magnitude of bad loans held by nonbanks
dwarfs those of the jusen).
19. See, e.g., Jon Choy, Nonperforming Loans Haunt Nonbank Financial Firms, JEI Rep.
(Japan Econ. Inst. of Am.), Nov. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File
[hereinafter Choy, Nonbank Bad Loans] (noting statement by head of the Ministry of Finance
that nonbank failures could become a “major problem” if their effects spread to other financial
institutions); Jusen Anatomy, supra note 6 (calling the jusen scandal “one of the largest political
blunders in the history of post war Japan”); Mondale, U.S., Stress Neutrality on Controversial
Jusen Bailout Scheme, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNABus File (discussing U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale’s statement
regarding the severity of the jusen problem and the possibility of it causing “international
instability”).
20. One commentator remarks that Japanese policy makers possess few economically
feasible tools with which to engineer a recovery.  See Sheryl WuDunn, Japanese Stocks Off
10% in Grim Week, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997, at 37.
21. The terms “securitization,” “asset securitization,” and “structured finance” are often
used interchangeably.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 133 n.1 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy].  In essence,
securitization is a process by which assets are pooled and securities are issued backed by the
cash flows from these assets.  See infra Part II.  The cash flows normally consist of payment
obligations, such as accounts receivables, that are owed the issuing company by some third
party.  See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE].
These payment obligations are generically referred to as “receivables” and the company that is
owed the receivables is usually called the “originator.”  See id.
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collateral, would be one possible, efficient and productive use of
these assets.  In addition, the issuance of asset-backed securities
(ABS) would provide those charged with handling the nonper-
forming debt access to new and cheaper sources of funds.22  As a
result of investor interest in developing jusen real estate collateral,
the real estate market would experience huge infusions of cash,
resulting in greater liquidity and higher prices.  Japanese and foreign
investors would also benefit from the increased ability to diversify
their portfolios with Japanese ABS.
Although the field of asset securitization has grown relatively
little in Japan since studies were first conducted in 1988, significant
reforms in 199223 and 199524 precipitated the first securitizations by
Japanese companies and banks, greatly increasing its acceptance as a
viable financing technique.  Jusen securitization25 could significantly
enhance Japan’s ABS market by creating a broad, liquid market
supported by large Japanese banks and foreign investors.26  With
taxpayer opinion adamantly opposed to a publicly-funded clean-up
effort, jusen securitization would shift the burden from the public to
the private sector.  Moreover, structured finance specialists, who
have honed their skills in the U.S. and elsewhere for nearly 30 years,
would be eager to export their expertise to the Japanese market.27
Part I of this Note analyzes the causes and severity of the jusen
crisis and the toll it has taken on the nation as a whole.  Part II
introduces the concept of asset securitization, outlining the primary
benefits it affords corporations and investors, and then discusses the
current state of securitization in Japan.  Finally, Part III analyzes
whether securitization would be both a desirable and feasible
solution to the jusen crisis.  While concluding that securitization of
nonperforming assets would be an effective solution to some of
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
24. In 1995, the MOF decided to permit financial institutions to issue ABS in Japan
commencing in 1996.  See infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
25. Throughout this Note, the term “jusen securitization” shall mean the securitization of
nonperforming loans, including real estate collateral, originated by jusen and issued either by
jusen parent companies or other entities involved in eliciting value from jusen assets.  Similarly,
“jusen securities” refer to securities backed by the former assets of jusen.
26. Creating a sophisticated and liquid Japanese ABS market in which to place “jusen
securities” is crucial to the long-term success of this plan.  Realistically, however, because the
Japanese market may be unable to handle such a large issuance of securities in the short-term,
the European and U.S. capital markets may be needed to help provide liquidity and capital.
27. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Japan’s bad loan problems, this Note also acknowledges the existence
of significant barriers to implementing such a program, particularly
the nontransparency of financial statements and records of Japanese
banks and corporations.
I. THE JUSEN BAD LOAN CRISIS
Much of corporate Japan is characterized by a system of
conglomerates, called keiretsu.28  The keiretsu are normally centered
around a single large bank and consist of “groups of major
corporations in disparate industries tied together by a minority of
interlocking shareholdings.”29  As a result of this complicated
corporate network in which debt and equity frequently change hands,
it is difficult to accurately calculate the amount of bad loans
outstanding in Japan;30 it is even more difficult to estimate how much
of these loans are attributable to the jusen.  The MOF estimates the
size of the jusen losses at $81.3 billion.31  The ultimate cost of the
jusen scandal will depend on future economic conditions and policy
actions as well as accounting practices used to assess the losses.32
28. See generally WILLIAM S. DIETRICH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN 84 (1991)
(describing the prevalence of keiretsu).
29. Id.
30. Estimates of the total amount of nonperforming loans on Japanese balance sheets
range from $100 billion to $972 billion.  See, e.g., Jathon Sapsford, Japan’s Estimate on Banks’
Problem Loans Leaps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1998, at A17 (reporting that the MOF tripled its
earlier estimates of the total outstanding bad loans and placing the figure at $577.5 billion);
After “Jusen” Bail-out, Japan Banks May Go, Reuters Fin. Serv., Sept. 19, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File (approximating the range of value of nonperforming loans
to be between $100 and $450 billion); Coalition Government Alters Jusen Scheme in Bid to Get
Public Support, Banking Daily (BNA), Mar. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABus File (estimating bad debts to be between $390 and $972 billion); D’Amato Voices
Concern over Fed’s Reported Liquidity Plan with Japan, 65 Banking Rep. (BNA) 672, 627 (Oct.
23, 1995) (reporting that private sector analysts put roughly an $800 billion total on bad loans
held by Japanese banks); Top Asian Lessors 1995, ASSET FIN. & LEASING DIG., June 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Top Asian Lessors] (noting, in a
report by Merrill Lynch, that 21 Japanese banks wrote off $102 billion in bad loans in the year
ending March 1996 alone).
31. See Ugly Roots, supra note 7.  A September 1996 article in the Weekly Post reported
that the amount of uncollectible loans held by the seven jusen was $133.9 billion. See Jusen
Resolution Policy Faces a Deadlock, WKLY. POST (Japan), Sept. 9-15, 1996, available at
<http://www.weeklypost.com/960909/960909a.htm>.
32. The analysis of the cost of the jusen clean-up is similar to that of the S&L bailout in
this regard.  For example, the cost of cleaning up insolvent jusen will depend on the degree of
insolvencies, which will be largely determined by the future course of real estate values.  See
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT
REGULATION 193 (1991).  The effectiveness of the government in liquidating, securitizing, or
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Rising land prices and an effective securitization program33 could
dramatically reduce the ultimate price of the clean-up.  Irrespective
of the tactics employed, however, the bad loan problem will be an
issue for the next several years.34
A.  Causes of the Jusen Crisis
A multiplicity of factors led to the jusen’s acquisition of $80-100
billion of nonperforming loans.  Risky lending,35 coupled with
inopportune market conditions at the end of the bubble era,36 laid the
foundation for the massive procurement of debt by jusen.  Later,
legislative inaction in the face of rising debt,37 exacerbated by the
manipulation of accounting regulations,38 allowed jusen to cover up
and ultimately worsen their own plight.  Finally, the failing health of
jusen balance sheets was met with a concurrent downgrading of their
credit,39 which drove them even deeper into debt.
The most important factor contributing to the jusen bad debt
crisis was the capricious lending of jusen executives during the bubble
era.40  As real estate values rose to unprecedented levels, jusen credit
officers lent aggressively and, as it turned out, foolishly, to scores of
otherwise disposing of the jusen’s assets will also greatly affect the ultimate cost of the clean-up.
See id. at 194.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18.
35. See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
40. The large number of arrests and indictments that have surfaced among borrowers as
well as insiders of jusen evidence the jusen executives’ inadequate credit and background
checks.  See, e.g., 4 Ex-Jusen Execs Face 3.6 Bil. Yen Lawsuit, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), July
20, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Ex-Jusen Execs] (reporting that four former jusen executives are
being sued in connection with losses incurred through the extension of illegal credit); Nanatomi
Execs Held for Stalling Debt Recovery, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 17, 1997, at 2 (noting
that a major jusen borrower was being held on charges of obstructing recovery of real estate
assets); Real Estate Executives Held in Loan Scam, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Oct. 9, 1997, at 2
(reporting that a real estate company defrauded a jusen out of 1.2 billion yen ($9.9 million)); 3
Arrested in Faking of Firm’s Net Worth, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), July 18, 1997, at 2
(discussing the arrest of an attorney and two officials of a real estate company on suspicion of
fabricating financial statements in order to hide assets from creditors); Togensha Head Gets 2
Years for Shirking Debt, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Aug. 7, 1997, at 2 (announcing the
sentencing of a real estate firm president, whose company was a major jusen borrower, to two
years in prison for attempting to avoid his obligations to creditors).
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unworthy borrowers.41  In connection with such lending, banks have
been criticized for not keeping tighter reins on their jusen
subsidiaries.42
Intense competition by Japanese commercial banks for the
individual retail market was perhaps the main impetus for jusen
involvement in riskier commercial lending transactions.43  The banks’
entry into the housing loan business may have strained jusen
profitability, thereby “pushing jusen firms into the risky real estate
lending business” in search of additional profit opportunities.44  Jusen
found themselves competing in a market about which they knew
relatively little.45  Some hired “experts” from parent companies to
take charge of the new operations, but the departments could not
compete with the more experienced commercial lenders.46  In their
efforts to provide “quick responses” to customers, jusen performed
inadequate credit checks on borrowers.47  The rise in interest rates
during and immediately after the bubble era may have also increased
the jusen’s thirst for higher returns in order to offset the considerably
lower long-term mortgage rates into which they were locked.48  To
avoid being squeezed out of the market,49 jusen invested in riskier
deals to increase their return on capital and remain competitive with
other financial institutions.50
Loose lending was not the only flaw of jusen.  Consistent with
the well-documented Japanese affinity for loyalty and the cultivation
41. See supra note 40.
42. See Mari Koseki, Jusen Debtor Tells Diet Loans Can’t Be Repaid, JAPAN TIMES
WKLY., May 19, 1996, at 1 (relaying remarks of former jusen president, Hidezo Hara).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See supra note 6 and text accompanying note 9 (defining jusen as corporations
primarily in the business of mortgage lending).  This situation was analogous to the one that
faced S&Ls in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  S&Ls held nondiverse portfolios of long-term,
fixed-rate mortgages which were funded by short-term obligations.  See Robert J. Laughlin,
Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S301, S309-S310 (1991).
When interest rates rose, depositors withdrew their money from the thrifts and placed it in
higher return investments; however, the thrifts were stuck with their long-term loans at the
lower rates with no way to procure cheap capital to make more profitable loans.  See id. at
S310; see also WHITE, supra note 32, at 67 (analyzing the increase in interest rates between the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and the government’s subsequent response).
49. As jusen earned low mortgage rates and borrowed at increasingly higher prime levels,
their spreads (or profit margins) evaporated.
50. See Koseki, supra note 42.
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of relationships,51 jusen occasionally provided financial aid to key
customers in financial distress.  While such a practice may have
enhanced customer loyalty, the amount of money jusen gave to
subsidize certain key customers was clearly inappropriate.52  In one
instance, to aid a major borrower in dire financial straits, a jusen firm
purchased a section of Tokyo real estate for $15 million more than
the borrower paid for it that same day.53
The huge decline in the Tokyo stock market was also
problematic for jusen.  After the Nikkei index soared to 38,915 in
December 1989, the government raised interest rates, hoping to
thwart the “unsustainable rise in asset values.”54  Following this fiscal
tightening, the Nikkei plunged to a low of 14,309 in August 1992.55
The seven-year bear market,56 which accompanied the end of the
bubble era, significantly contributed to the jusen’s troubles.  When
stocks soared in the 1980s, companies were able to offset their bad
debt with gains from equity.57  However, the fall of stock prices in the
post-bubble era eliminated the possibility of offset.  The problem was
especially pronounced for Japanese banks and mortgage companies,
which traditionally hold significant blocks of stock in major
borrowers.58  Their decisions to purchase these large blocks were
often based more on the goal of building or maintaining relations59
than on the goal of maximizing investment returns.  As a result, many
of their portfolios were not diversified enough to spread losses.60
The real estate market also experienced devastating drops in
value during the post-bubble years.  This decline, precipitated by a
51. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Time for a Shake-out, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 1997, at 4
(noting that the relationships between banks and construction groups in past decades followed
the “traditional Japanese pattern of corporate loyalties”).
52. See Koseki, supra note 42.
53. See id.
54. David Holley, Nikkei Index Continues on Its Wild Ride, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at
D1.
55. See id.
56. Analysts estimate the bear market began in July 1990 and continues today.  See
WuDunn, supra note 20.
57. See Holley, supra note 54.
58. See Sandra Sugawara, Japanese Shares Take Nose Dive, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1997, at
D1.
59. See Charles Smith, IBJ’s Moment of Truth, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int’l ed.), Nov.
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File (referring to these blocks as
“semipermanent holdings of ‘political’ shares . . . that were originally acquired to cement
business relationships”).
60. See Sugawara, supra note 58.
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1990 clamp-down on real estate-linked lending by the MOF, was a
primary factor in the jusen’s inability to repay loans to parent
companies and other financial institutions.61  The 1990 MOF real
estate reform imposed a duty on lending institutions to report their
real estate loans to the MOF;62 however, jusen were excluded from
this obligation.63  The MOF probably exempted jusen in an attempt to
facilitate new housing construction by reducing regulatory obstacles.
As a consequence of the MOF action, overall real estate lending
shrunk, but the jusen’s proportion of lending increased as they
continued to lend unencumbered by the new regulation.  The home
finance companies remained active in the commercial real estate
market,64 perhaps in an attempt to offset some of the losses they
incurred as a result of the sharp decline in the market.  Jusen
therefore sailed into risky (and for them uncharted) waters with little
MOF oversight.  Had jusen not been exempt from the MOF
regulations, the amount of real estate losses may have been
significantly lower.
Some commentators have also criticized the MOF for failing to
take any corrective action when jusen debt levels first surfaced.65
Although an investigation of the jusen in 1991 and 1992 determined
that their uncollectible debt totaled $46.5 billion, the MOF did not
intervene66 in the hope that an economic upturn would obviate the
need for intervention.67  In retrospect, earlier intervention by the
MOF might have decreased the amount of jusen debt that was
ultimately amassed.
While criticism of the government’s failure to take affirmative
steps to curtail the early signs of crisis appears warranted, there is
evidence that some portion of the bad loans held by jusen were
concealed by jusen insiders.68  An audit of one of the seven major
61. See Koseki, supra note 42.
62. See Ugly Roots, supra note 7.
63. See id.
64. See Koseki, supra note 42.
65. See, e.g., Juhl, supra note 7 (citing as an example of such a critique the International
Monetary Fund, which, in its August 1995 report on international capital markets, assigned
blame to Japanese regulatory authorities for failing to act swiftly in the bad loan crisis).
66. See Jusen Anatomy, supra note 6.
67. See Juhl, supra note 7.
68. See, e.g., Koseki, supra note 42 (reporting that the financial records of several sub-
sidiaries of a Tokyo-based real estate corporation did not match those of the parent company).
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jusen, the Juso corporation, supports this claim.69  The MOF’s vague
definition of nonperforming loans also may have contributed to the
jusen’s ability to hide the true extent of their losses.  To address some
of these problems, the MOF proposed new reporting guidelines in
March 1994 that would require banks to present a clearer picture of
their own financial positions as well as those of their subsidiaries.70
The increased bad debt held by Japanese banks, jusen, and other
financial institutions was a primary factor in the downgrading of their
credit ratings by U.S. rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s and
Moody’s.71  The lower ratings raised the jusen’s cost of financing in
the United States and Europe, making it more difficult for them to
profit in the consumer or commercial lending markets.72  This
additional cost of raising funds in the capital markets is often referred
to as the “Japan Premium.”73
B.  Effects of the Jusen Crisis on Japan’s Economy
The jusen crisis has had many far-reaching effects.  Since jusen
primarily provided credit to consumers in the housing market,74 a
69. See Ugly Roots, supra note 7 (stating that the financial information presented in the
company report misrepresented its actual financial position); see also Ex-Jusen Execs, supra
note 40 (reporting civil suit brought against former jusen executives for failure to fully
investigate the financial situation of the borrowers and for failure to secure adequate
collateral).
70. See Jon Choy, Japanese Banks Bailing But Bad Loans Still Rising, JEI Rep. (Japan
Econ. Inst. of Am.), May 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File [hereinafter
Choy, Rising Loans].
71. See id.; see also BOJ Exec Calls ‘Japan Premium’ an Overreaction, Japan Economic
Newswire, Oct. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Japan
Premium] (relaying the comment of Shigeoki Togo, director of the central bank’s international
department, that the risk premium which Japanese financial institutions had to pay to borrow
in the overseas money market was “unjustified”); Yoko Shibata, Japan Finally Takes the
Plunge, GLOBAL FIN., Oct. 1996, at 46-47 (noting that the downgrading of some Japanese
banks’ credit ratings was a result of the Daiwa Bank scandal which took place in September
1995).
72. Cf. ANAT BIRD, CAN S&LS SURVIVE? THE EMERGING RECOVERY, RESTRUCTURING
& REPOSITIONING OF AMERICA’S S&LS 142 (1993) (explaining how, since the late 1970s,
pressures on net interest margins resulted in decreased profitability in the lending businesses of
banks and S&Ls in the United States).
73. See Japan Premium, supra note 71.  The premium is the additional return investors
require over comparable American or European securities for the additional risk associated
with Japanese issuers as a consequence of the bad loan crisis.  See id.  As of November 1997,
Japanese banks were paying at least a 20 basis point premium over the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) (each basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point).  See
Stephanie Strom, Bailing Out of the Bailout Game, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at D2.
74. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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likely short-term effect of jusen insolvencies is the drying of capital
for individuals who wish to purchase homes.  With the loss of jusen
financing for consumers, banks and other financial institutions will
experience a barrage of excess demand that will naturally drive
lending rates upward.75
In the midst of Japan’s sluggish economy, some of the nation’s
largest commercial banks are experiencing strains on their balance
sheets as a result of jusen insolvencies and rising bad debt.76  In order
to liquidate debt from some of the seven insolvent jusen to which
they had made loans, these large banks are recalling loans and cutting
off favorable treatment for their own borrowers, many of whom are
nonbank financial institutions.77
The Housing Loan Administration Corporation’s (HLAC)78
aggressive pursuance of debt repayment by jusen customers has
further impaired the situation for other nonbank financial
institutions.  Since many of the former customers of jusen are also
customers of the nonbank entities, money that the HLAC procures
from jusen customers is money that otherwise would have been
available to repay the debts owed to nonbank creditors.79
In domino-like fashion, the pressure on nonbank institutions will
affect investment in the capital markets since many market
speculators obtain capital from nonbank entities.80  Moreover,
companies associated with jusen and others with bad loans in such
disparate fields as banking, securities, insurance, real estate, and
construction are watching their stock values plummet.81  Because
financial institutions are required to keep their capital-to-assets ratios
at certain levels, the fall in stock prices encourages them to reduce
lending, which further slows economic growth.82  In addition, since
Japanese banks have traditionally used unrealized gains in the stock
75. See Choy, Nonbank Bad Loans, supra note 19.
76. See id.
77. See id. (citing Nichiei Finance as one of the casualties of the commercial banks’ recent
tough treatment of nonbank borrowers).
78. The Housing Loan Administration Corporation (HLAC) was established in 1996 to
deal with jusen insolvencies, including the disposition of their bad debt.  See infra notes 104-06
and accompanying text.
79. See Choy, Nonbank Bad Loans, supra note 19.
80. See id.
81. See Sugawara, supra note 58.
82. See Gillian Tett, Tokyo Shares Hit by Bankruptcy Fears, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
27, 1997, at 3.
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market to offset nonperforming loans, the stock market’s plunge has
weakened the banks’ ability to write off portions of their bad loans.83
The Japan Premium associated with Japanese banks’ efforts to
raise funds in capital markets84 may continue to rise if action is not
taken swiftly to revive the economy and address the bad loan
problem through deregulation and innovative structured financing
tools.85  If such action is not taken, the Japanese banks’ high cost of
borrowing will exacerbate their difficulties paying old debts and
funding both new and existing business operations.86
C.  The Clean-Up
1.  Early Efforts.  In early 1993 the MOF permitted Japanese
banks to form the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC)
to help manage the nonperforming loans of banks, jusen, and other
nonbank financial institutions.87  The company operated much like
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which liquidated real
estate collateral and bad loans of U.S. Savings and Loans from 1989-
1995.88  The Japanese banks and jusen transferred assets to the CCPC
for disposition, but they had to absorb any losses incurred by the
83. See Chandler, supra note 8; Anthony Rowley, Japanese Banks’ Bad Loans Hit 28
Trillion Yen, BUS. TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 24, 1997, at 4; Zitner, supra note 8.
84. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
85. See Sugawara, supra note 58.  The need to inject confidence into the Japanese financial
market appears especially urgent following the spurts of extreme volatility in the Asian stock
exchanges in the latter part of 1997 and early 1998.  See, e.g., Sara Webb & Silvia Ascarelli,
Global Markets Sink, but U.S. Shares Rebound, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1998, at C1 (showing that
the values of several Asian stock exchanges have plummeted since July of 1997); Shaanthi
Katathil, World Markets: Asian Stocks Continue Their Roller Coaster Ride; More Volatility
Likely as Currencies Fall Further, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1997, at C14; Patrick McGeehan, Asian
Maelstrom Disrupts Smooth Sailing for New Stocks, Bonds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at R38.
86. Cf. Timothy L. O’Brien, Debt Ratings of 3 Nations in Asia Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1997, at D5 (explaining that the recent downgrading of the sovereign debt of South Korea,
Indonesia and Thailand by Moody’s Investors Services, Inc. to “junk” status will have a
significant effect on not only those countries’ ability to raise money, but also on financial
markets throughout Asia).
87. See Choy, Rising Loans, supra note 70.
88. See generally OFFICE OF PLANNING, RES., AND STAT., RESOLUTION TRUST
CORPORATION, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: AUG. 1989 – SEPT. 1995, at 1 (1995) (presenting a
brief description of RTC’s purpose and activities).  The RTC, which took over 747 institutions
collectively worth approximately $403 billion, was generally responsible for managing,
marketing, and selling the assets and liabilities of failed or failing thrifts to pay creditors and
insured deposit accounts.  See id.
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CCPC in the disposition of the low-grade assets.89  These losses were
often considerable as the CCPC sold only a fraction of the assets it
received.90
As part of its 1994 economic stimulus package, the MOF
permitted banks to write off losses incurred on loans to nonbank
financial institutions,91 including jusen.  In effect, this gave jusen a
“fresh start”92 to proceed with their traditional lending activities,
albeit with a more conservative investment strategy.  Of course, the
jusen’s larger problems stemmed not from money they owed, but
from money owed to them.  In an effort to reduce the tax burden on
struggling jusen and parent banks, the MOF permitted banks to
establish “special purpose companies” (SPCs) into which their most
delinquent loans would be placed in exchange for equity in these new
SPCs.93  By selling these troubled assets to the SPCs at large
discounts, the banks could substantially reduce their taxable income.94
At least one bank in 1994 took the unusual step of reducing
dividends in an effort to improve its balance sheet.95  The less than
one cent dividend reduction appeared more symbolic than financially
significant;96 analysts said the cut was virtually unnoticeable on the
89. See Edward J. Park, Comment, Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in Securitization:
Potential Benefits, Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories for Reform, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
723, 730-31 n.43 (1996).
90. See Choy, Rising Loans, supra note 70 (reporting that the CCPC had sold only $154.5
million of a total of $26.4 billion worth of property that comprised its portfolio in its first year).
91. See id.
92. Allowing debtors a “fresh start” is one of the fundamental principals underlying
United States bankruptcy law.  See Seth J. Gerson, Note, Separate Classification of Student
Loans in Chapter 13, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 269, 269 (1995).  This concept recognizes the economic
efficiency of debt forgiveness in enabling bankrupt parties to regain their productive capacities
through the retention of future earnings.  See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)
(referring to the fresh start as a principle of bankruptcy law which gives the debtor “a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preëxisting [sic]
debt”).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.  Banks and corporations generally refrain from cutting dividends due to the
adverse effects such a measure often has on stock prices and shareholders’ perceptions.  See
EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 693 (5th ed. 1989)
(explaining that a corporation’s stock price will generally decline if the company makes a
dividend reduction or a less-than-expected dividend increase).
96. The bank that reduced its dividend was Hokkaido Takushoku Bank Ltd., Japan’s
smallest commercial bank.  See Choy, Rising Loans, supra note 70.  The bank subsequently
went into bankruptcy after its huge portfolio of bad loans inhibited the bank’s ability to raise
short-term funds.  See Strom, supra note 73.
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bank’s balance sheet.97  But rating agencies and shareholders may
have interpreted the cut as a positive sign that management was
moving in the right direction.  While dividend cuts may have been
marginally successful in creating goodwill with Japanese taxpayers,
they could not bring large enough savings to offset the losses from
jusen loans.
2.  Later Developments.  In June 1996 the Japanese Diet passed
two jusen liquidation bills.98  The first bill authorized the use of $6.8
billion of taxpayer money in current cleanup efforts.99  The second
bill stipulated that public money will be used to cover half of the
“secondary” losses expected to arise in the future.100  Most agree that
the issue is not whether secondary losses will exist, but rather how
large they will be.  The MOF stated that if the agencies established to
manage jusen affairs have deficits after five years, it intends to use
public monies to cover the gap.101  Analysts predict the clean-up will
require an additional $12 billion under current market conditions.102
At the heart of the government’s legislative efforts was the
creation of dissolution agencies to tackle the specific sectors of the
market affected by bad loans.103  Of particular interest to the jusen
was the formation of the Housing Loan Administration Corporation.
Modeled after the RTC, the HLAC was established in July 1996 to
acquire the assets and liabilities of the seven failed or failing jusen.104
At its inception in October, it acquired $64 billion worth of jusen
loans and property.105  Approximately $12 billion of that amount was
considered entirely unrecoverable.106
97. See Choy, Rising Loans, supra note 70.
98. See Kaoruko Aita, Diet Passes Jusen Bills Without Amendments, JAPAN TIMES WKLY.,
June 30, 1996, at 5.
99. The cost per capita of this portion of the clean-up was approximately $50 ($6.8
billion/125 million people).  See id.
100. See id.
101. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18.
102. See Aita, supra note 98.
103. See Jusen Loan Trade, supra note 5.
104. See Tokutei Jyutaku Kinyu Senmon Kaisha no Saiken Saimu no Shori Sokushin Nado
ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochi Ho [Special Treatment Law Concerning the Expedited Resolution
of Debts of Certain Jusen Companies], Law No. 93 of 1996, art. 1, HOREI ZENSHO, 98-102
(June 1996); see also Japan Forces Bankruptcy in Loan Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1996, at
D7 [hereinafter Loan Scandal].  In 1996, the HLAC was also involved in the liquidation of the
jusen as part of a $6.8 billion clean-up package.  See Aita, supra note 98.
105. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18.
106. See id.
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The Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC), Japan’s version of
the FDIC, provided the initial $2 billion to get the HLAC off the
ground.107  This initial support, however, was insufficient, as the Bank
of Japan and other large financial institutions were required to make
subsequent infusions of capital.108  Cases that the HLAC deems too
difficult are passed on to the DIC.109  Without the benefit of
dramatically improved land prices or innovative structured finan-
cings, the director of the HLAC predicted that a complete liquidation
of jusen assets could take as long as fifteen years.110
Given the expected length and magnitude of the jusen bad loan
clean-up, the Japanese public has responded vociferously to being
told it must bail out the private sector for misguided investments
during the bubble era.  Unlike the S&L “bailout,” in which U.S.
taxpayers paid to make their fellow citizens whole on their federally
insured deposit accounts,111 Japanese taxpayers will derive few, if any,
direct economic benefits from the proposed use of their funds.  The
potential indirect benefits, such as lower mortgage rates, may be too
remote to allay the pervasive anger of Japanese taxpayers.
Concerned taxpayers have organized to discuss government bailout
proposals and to recommend specific legislative action.112  Japanese
citizens take the position that jusen and the banking industry were
responsible for creating a large portion of the problem and should
therefore be forced to pay the majority of the clean-up costs.113
II. SECURITIZATION
The foregoing discussion of the jusen crisis brings to light the
severity and immediacy of Japan’s problems.  Securitization of the
nonperforming assets of jusen could provide an alternative source of
funding for Japanese banks still mired in jusen debt, rejuvenate
107. See id.
108. See US Specialists See Profit in Jusen Loans, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 5, 1996, at 12
[hereinafter Profit in Jusen Loans].
109. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18.
110. See id.
111. The limit on FDIC insurance was $100,000 of principal and accrued interest per
account.  See WHITE, supra note 32, at 36.
112. See Aritake, supra note 11 (discussing the creation of the “Association to Ask Banks
to Accept Their Responsibility as Creditors”).
113. See id.  Japanese citizens are also particularly resentful of helping an industry known
to have ties with organized crime.  See Cameron Barr & Yoshiko Matsushita, Asia Woes Push
Japan to Bold Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 1997, at 1.
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Japan’s waning real estate market, and help to build Japan’s ABS
market.  Moreover, with public sentiment strongly opposed to using
additional tax revenues to solve the bad loan problem, a
securitization program that shifts the burden from the public to the
private sector will go far in helping the Japanese government save
face and mollify the disgruntled masses.
A.  Background
Securitization has been the subject of wide interest in financial
and legal communities for nearly thirty years.  Like many financial
innovations, securitization has taken many forms and has been
described in several ways.114  In a typical securitization, a company
transfers a pool of assets to another entity (the Special Purpose
Vehicle or SPV),115 which then issues securities backed by the assets
transferred.116
Since 1970, U.S. real estate financiers have been “securitizing
real estate assets via . . . securities representing ownership of indivi-
dual shares in a pool of mortgages.”117  Close to 80% of new single
family home mortgages are now securitized.118  The success of this
114. See, e.g., BIRD, supra note 72, at 130 (defining securitization as “a process of raising
funds through the issuance of marketable securities backed by future cash flow from income
producing assets”); Park, supra note 89, at 723 (“Securitization may be defined broadly as the
repackaging of illiquid assets and their associated cash flows into marketable securities.”);
Marsha E. Simms, Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BASED FINANCING: INCLUDING
SECURITIZATION AND ACQUISITION FINANCING 1995, at 431, 433 (PLI Commercial Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 708 (1995)) (“Asset securitization is a means of
financing a pool of assets.”).  For additional background on the topic of securitization, see
generally 1-2 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991) (writing, in a two-volume treatise, on
the fields of structured financing, financial asset pools, and asset-backed securities);
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21 (reviewing the fundamental principles of
asset securitization in a concise monograph); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1991)
(analyzing securitization from a theoretical and practical perspective and discussing its
increased use around the world).
115. See STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED FINANCE  – ASIA 51 (1997) [hereinafter S&P
CRITERIA].  The role of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is “to limit to the greatest extent
the likelihood of an insolvency of the issuer.”  Id.  Furthermore, “if the issuer is a subsidiary of
the seller of the assets, the use of a SPV structure will help to insulate the securitized assets
owned by the issuer from the effects of the insolvency of the seller.”  Id.
116. See Simms, supra note 114, at 433.
117. BIRD, supra note 72, at 132.  Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) are the product of
the securitization of pools of mortgage loans.  See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 2.4.2.
118. See BIRD, supra note 72, at 132.
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market led to new forms of securitization involving assets such as
student loans,119 credit card loans,120 long distance telephone receiv-
ables,121 automobile loans,122 and airplane leases.123  Through innova-
tive securitization techniques, the U.S. market for such securities
experienced extraordinary growth.124
Outside the United States, however, the growth of securitization
has been comparatively slow due to the complex nature of
securitization, and restrictive regulatory environments abroad.125
Exposing foreign corporations and governments to the benefits of
securitization may lead to the adoption of U.S.-style tax, bankruptcy,
and secured lending laws, which would facilitate asset securitization
around the globe.
B.  Benefits of Securitization
The benefits of securitization extend across a wide spectrum of
constituencies, but this section will focus on the two primary
beneficiaries: originators126 and investors.  Securitization benefits
originators in primarily three ways: 1) it allows a corporation to lower
its cost of capital and reduce risk; 2) it provides an alternative form of
financing; and 3) it enables corporations to engage in off-balance
119. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 2.4.3 (describing the first student loan securitization
done by “Sallie Mae” in 1973).
120. See id. § 2.4.4 n.15 (noting the first securitization of credit card loans structured by
Salomon Brothers in 1986).
121. Telefonos de Mexico was one of the first telephone companies in Latin America to
issue ABS backed by telephone receivables.  See Julia Meehan, Telmex Taps Securitization
Market, PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., Feb. 11, 1991, at 7.
122. The first car loan securitization was developed by Salomon Brothers in January of
1985.  See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, at § 2.4.4 n.13.
123. The first lease-backed securities were offered in 1985 by Comdisco.  See id. § 2.4.4
n.14.
124. The MBS market alone is well over $900 billion.  See id. § 2.4.5.  The total market of
securitized assets is believed to be in excess of $1 trillion.  See Michael T. Kawachi, The New
Law of Asset Securitization in Japan, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 587, 590 (1994).  In 1997,
the asset-backed bond market reached a record $185.1 billion in new issuances, which topped
1996’s $150.1 billion.  Issuances are expected to exceed $215 billion in 1998.  See Gregory
Zuckerman, Asset-Backed Securities Face a Tricky Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1998, at C1.
125. See Park, supra note 89, at 727.  Japan is an example of a market in which tight
regulation has slowed the progress of the securitization and secondary markets for asset-backed
securities.  See Kawachi, supra note 124, at 591.  But see Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at
1422-23 (arguing that securitization backed by United States assets is growing rapidly abroad).
Shenker and Colletta argue that the market forces necessary to support an ABS market in
Japan exist, but have been stifled (until recently) by restrictive legal barriers.  See id. at 1424.
126. See supra note 21 (defining originator).
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sheet financing.  From the perspective of investors, securitization
offers increased diversification and liquidity in the ABS market.
Companies that are not regarded as investment grade127 by rating
agencies must typically compensate capital market investors for the
use of their funds at relatively high rates.  Because these rates greatly
exceed those charged by banks and other lending institutions, non-
investment grade companies generally forego the vast resources of
the public markets.  Securitization structures allow originators to
obtain lower cost financing in the capital markets through the
issuance of securities by the SPV than if the originator had issued its
own securities.128  The lower cost issuance is made possible because
the “sale”129 to the SPV insulates the assets and attendant cash flows
from the general risk to the originator.130  Moreover, the SPV usually
has no other assets or obligations other than those transferred to it by
127. Investment grade quality refers to the designation that credit agencies, such as
Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s, give to a corporation to indicate that the corporation’s capacity
to pay interest timely and repay principal is very good.  Bonds rated either “AAA,” “AA,”
“A,” or “BBB” by Standard & Poor’s are commonly regarded as investment grade.  See S&P
CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 11; Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 137 n.15.
128. Simms, supra note 114, at 433; accord S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 11 (noting
that “[securitization] makes it possible to achieve a higher rating on the debt than the rating of
the asset originator,” thereby lowering the originator’s cost of capital); see also Schwarcz,
Alchemy, supra note 21, at 146-51 (arguing that securitization is not a “zero-sum game,” rather
it allows net benefits to accrue to both originators and investors).
129. The “sale” of assets to the SPV/issuer of the rated securities must be regarded as a
“true sale” by one of the major rating agencies in order to decrease the likelihood that a
bankruptcy court would deem the transaction a form of secured financing rather than a
purchase and sale of assets.  See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 41-42.  The seminal case
addressing the distinction between a sale and a secured loan is Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v.
Castle Credit Corporation, Inc., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d Cir. 1979) (recharacterizing a sale
transaction as a secured loan); see also SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at
31 (discussing the problems involved in attempts to harmonize court decisions in this area due
to the variety of factors considered in a sale versus secured loan analysis).
130. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 51.  In some cases, however, the risks of the
originator cannot be completely detached from the SPV.  One example is in the franchisor-
franchisee context.  If the originator/franchisor goes bankrupt, the goodwill associated with the
franchise and the subsequent value in the franchise contract will be jeopardized, causing the
franchisee/obligor to halt payments to the franchisor.  See infra note 261 and accompanying
text.  Another interesting example involves the securitization of loans made by Broken Hill
Proprietary Company Ltd. (BHP) to its employees.  See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 791 (4th ed. 1997).  The loans were made by BHP as an attempt to
encourage employee stock participation in order to thwart a hostile take-over.  See id. at 807.
Since employees would only default on the loans if the stock price was low, the receivables
(employee loans) transferred to the SPV were, therefore, intimately tied to the health of
BHP—the originator.
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the originator.131  After the transfer, the SPV’s rating and the
securities it issues will be dependent on the credit quality of the
receivables, rather than the creditworthiness of the originator.132
Lower cost financing is only possible, however, when the overall
credit rating of the originator is lower than the rating of the particular
assets it has available to securitize.133  By transferring the higher rated
assets to an entity structured in such a way as to make it bankruptcy-
remote,134 the SPV can access the securities markets at a lower cost
than the originator would face.
Closely related to an originator’s cost of capital is its level of
risk.  The riskiness of a company’s portfolio of assets significantly
affects its expected returns and ultimately plays a large role in the
company’s ability to timely pay its own obligations.  The ability of the
company to pay its obligations, of course, directly affects the
company’s credit rating as determined by rating agencies.135  A
company can attempt to reduce the riskiness of its asset portfolio
through diversification,136 by selling a portion of its assets to an SPV
and using the cash proceeds to invest in other assets that reduce its
overall risk exposure.  By reducing its concentration of assets,137 a
131. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 51 (noting that the SPV must be set up solely to
“buy and hold assets for the rated debt”).
132. See id. at 11; see also SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 1 (“A
potential buyer of the securities . . . looks to the cash flow from the purchased receivables, and
not necessarily to the credit of the selling company, for repayment.”).
133. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 11.
134. The term “bankruptcy-remote” refers to the state of an SPV or other entity when it is
insulated from any claims in bankruptcy against the company (usually the originator) from
which the SPV acquired its assets.  For an extended discussion of bankruptcy-remoteness, see
generally SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 16-27 (highlighting the
possible adverse effects of the originator’s bankruptcy on the SPV); S&P CRITERIA, supra note
115, at 51-52 (describing the characteristics which must be present to achieve bankruptcy-
remoteness).
135. See supra note 127.
136. Just as effective diversification enables a corporation to reduce the unsystematic
(stock-specific) risk of a portfolio of securities, it also enables a company to reduce the asset-
specific risks associated with a particular portfolio of assets it holds.  For example, if a bank
holds a portfolio of loans in which all the debtors are movie studios, it is particularly vulnerable
to the health of the movie industry.  However, if it were to expand its debtor base to include
real estate developers and individual home owners, then the bank’s assets (namely, the
principal and interest payments on these loans) would be exposed to less risk (assuming the
risks of these three classes of debtors are not perfectly positively correlated).  See generally
ROBERT C. RADCLIFFE, INVESTMENT: CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGY 225 (3d ed. 1990)
(discussing the concept of portfolio diversification).
137. See, e.g., 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 4.4 (illustrating the concept of diversification in
the context of bank loan securitizations).  For example, “[b]y selling loans and purchasing loan
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company’s expected cash flows should be less risky; this translates
into a higher credit rating and cheaper financing costs.  Furthermore,
a company can shed some of its low-quality assets to redeploy its
assets more profitably.138
Asset securitization also creates a new source of funds.  S&Ls,
for example, rely heavily on demand deposits as a source of funds.139
As competition from financial and non-depository institutions for
such deposits intensifies, the addition of a new funding source
significantly increases financial flexibility without impairing
traditional means of raising capital.140  In the recent past, new sources
of funds have become especially critical for low-quality borrowers
because of the significant quantities of underperforming loans
amassed by banks, both in the United States141 and Japan.
Finally, asset securitization enables a company to engage in off-
balance sheet financing.142  If a corporation were to issue debt
securities to investors, it would have to record the debt on its balance
sheet.143  When an originator transfers its assets to a bankruptcy-
remote entity for the purpose of issuing ABS, however, the
transaction returns cash proceeds to the originator like a debt
offering, without the accompanying balance sheet liability.144
Off-balance sheet financing is especially significant for
companies in highly regulated industries, such as pension funds,
which are greatly restrained in their ability to assume high levels of
debt.145  The risk-based capital guidelines established by the 1988
participations or loan-backed securities, banks [and other nonbank financial institutions] can
better diversify their loan portfolios and continue to specialize in lending to particular types of
borrowers.”  Id.
138. See BIRD, supra note 72, at 141.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 141-42; see also infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefits of securitization to the holders of jusen assets).
141. See, e.g., Jeff Bailey, Continental Bank’s Planned Sale Caps Stormy History That
Included Bailout, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1994, at A6 (noting the $1 billion loss suffered by the
FDIC because of Continental Bank Co.’s bad loans); Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Few Economists
Expect Deflation in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at A1 (noting the similarity of Japan’s
bad loan problem to that of the U.S. in the early 1990s).
142. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 22.
143. See id. (citing FINANCIAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 94, CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED
SUBSIDIARIES (1987)).
144. See id. (discussing methods a company could use to achieve off-balance-sheet
treatment for its debt issuances).
145. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.10.1.
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Basle Accord,146 of which Japan is a signatory, also greatly restrict a
bank’s available financing options.147  The Basle Accord requires, for
example, that internationally active banks maintain sufficient levels
of capital in relation to their total credit risk exposure.148  Because
securitization transactions can be structured to generate cash without
increasing liabilities, the net effect will be an improvement in the
originator’s overall capital ratio.149  Therefore, companies in tight
regulatory frameworks can focus on investors’ needs and their own
investment strategies instead of concentrating on compliance with
legal limitations.150
In addition to allowing companies to secure new and less costly
funds through the capital markets and enabling off-balance sheet
financing, securitization also benefits investors.  Just like
corporations that diversify their assets through securitization,
investors, too, rely on diversification to manage the risks of their
investments.151  Accordingly, the availability of a wide spectrum of
asset-backed securities affords investors more opportunities to
146. The Basle Accord, created under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements and endorsed by twelve countries (Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Luxembourg), applies only to banks undertaking international business.  See Shenker &
Colletta, supra note 114, at 1414 & n.234.
147. See id. at 1413-16; cf. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 71 (noting
that under standard U.S. risk-based capital guidelines, only an asset sale, as opposed to a
security interest created in the asset, will reduce the institution’s capital requirements).
148. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1415.
149. Since cash from the sale of the receivables is added to the balance sheet without a
corresponding increase in liabilities, if the cash proceeds are used to pay off debt, the debt-to-
equity ratio decreases (that is, it improves).  See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra
note 21, at 2 (illustrating the disparate impact the method of financing has on a company’s
debt-to-equity ratio).  A company’s credit rating may also improve as a result of the improved
capital ratio since the company appears healthier.  Moreover, capital guidelines may assign
higher risk weightings to repossessed assets or other nonperforming assets.  Thus, in choosing
among assets, a bank could securitize its higher risk-weighted assets, thereby achieving
substantial reductions in its capital requirements.  See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at
1416 n.246; see also BIRD, supra note 72, at 143-44 (explaining that the securitization and sale
of high-risk loans can result in a significantly lower risk-based capital profile of the selling
institution since the loans’ high-risk capital requirements could be replaced by low-risk
Treasury or agency securities).
150. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.10.1.
151. Diversification is not limited to institutional investors.  Rather, small individual
investors, with wide-ranging levels of sophistication, utilize diversification as a useful method of
reducing the stock-specific (or “unsystematic”) risk in their portfolios.  See RADCLIFFE, supra
note 136, at 225.
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manage away their overall risk levels152 and better match their
investment horizons with their obligations.153
C.  Drawbacks of Securitization
While the benefits of asset securitization are numerous, the
extremely high transaction costs of structuring and implementing a
securitization preclude many issuers from employing this financing
tool.  The astronomical fees of attorneys, investment bankers, and
accountants generally make such transactions cost-effective only if
the financing will raise more than $50 million.154  Even the cost of
acquiring computer programs to monitor, analyze, and document the
pooled assets can be daunting.155  In light of the high transaction costs,
a company with alternative attractive sources of funds should think
twice about whether securitization of its assets will net any value.
Drawbacks also exist for investors.  As with any debt security,
the issuer may default on the fixed payment or become insolvent,
thereby causing the debt to become nearly worthless.  Default risk
should be relatively low for most ABS issuances, however, because of
the protections built into securitization structures.  For example,
most structures will satisfy the criteria which make the SPV
bankruptcy-remote, thereby protecting the underlying pool of assets
in the event of an originator’s default.156  In addition, most rated ABS
transactions will involve some form of credit enhancement;157 this
further ensures that investors will get paid in the event of an SPV or
originator default.
The risks inherent in the underlying assets pose more of a threat
to ABS investors than do the risks of an originator default.
152. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.10.2.
153. See BIRD, supra note 72, at 143 (describing the use of securitization to “match fund
assets with equal maturity liabilities”).
154. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 139.  One commentator believes the
threshold is closer to $75 million.  See BIRD, supra note 72, at 159.
155. See BIRD, supra note 72, at 145.
156. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
157. “Credit enhancement” refers to the guarantee by a highly rated third-party to repay all
or part of a security’s principal in the event of an issuer default.  For a discussion of credit
enhancement, see 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.11.3 (discussing third-party guarantees);
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 13-15.  The term “liquidity facility,”
conversely, refers to a third-party guarantee of timely payment of a security’s accrued interest
and principal in the event of an issuer delay.  See id. at 5, 13-15.  Both of these forms of
enhancement may constitute a significant portion of the cost of a securitization structure.  See
infra text accompanying note 220.
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Securitization of a company’s assets shifts much of the risk associated
with those assets to the investors of the securities.158  These risks
include prepayment,159 obligor default, and changes in market
conditions that affect the value of the receivables.160  For example,
when a bank securitizes receivables that are prepayable, such as
mortgage loans, there is a substantial risk that the obligors will
prepay the loans if interest rates fall.  Although collection should be
sufficient to pay off the principal amount of the debt, the security
holders may have bargained for a specific rate of interest over an
extended period.161  Unstable conditions in the economy also increase
the risk of fluctuations in the value of the collateral.162  While these
risks are serious, SPVs can generally reduce the risk to investors by
effectively diversifying the pools of assets underlying the securities
and utilizing credit or liquidity enhancement.163
Investors may also incur high information costs analyzing the
quality of the asset pools in which they invest.164  Since asset pool
structures differ markedly from deal to deal, investors cannot rely
upon historical default rates to accurately predict the risk of the
current pool.165  Moreover, unstable economic conditions make
predictions based on past experiences wholly unreliable.  Therefore,
in order to assess the true risk associated with particular securities,
investors must obtain information from other costly sources, such as
originators, insurance companies, and rating agencies.166
Given the wide disparity in the depth of the secondary markets
in which ABS are traded, investors may also incur substantial
liquidity risks.167  An investor in a less active ABS market, such as
158. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 4.5.
159. See id. § 5.11.5 (explaining that borrowers are likely to repay their loans when interest
rates fall).
160. While investors assume the risk of loss on the acquired interest in the receivables, the
credit enhancement that accompanies most rated securitization transactions lowers this risk.
See Park, supra note 89, at 732.
161. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 10 n.10.
162. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.11.1.
163. See Japan Asset-Backed Securities to Boost Corp. Funding: Report, CAPITAL MARKET
REP. (Dow Jones & Co.), Feb. 1, 1996, available in WL-ALLNEWS PLUS; Park, supra note
89, at 732.
164. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 5.11.2.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Liquidity may be defined as “[t]he amount of time required to convert an asset into
cash or pay a liability.”  2 GLENN G. MUNN ET AL., 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE
660 (libr. ed., 9th ed. rev. 1993).  “Liquidity risk,” then, encompasses the risk that the holder of
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music royalty-backed securities,168 may experience more difficulty
entering or exiting the market than if he were trading in mortgage-
backed securities.
Finally, the holders of ABS face risks associated with dynamic
legal environments.  Laws relating to tax, bankruptcy, and exchange
controls will greatly affect both the originator’s ability to structure a
securitization transaction as well as the investors’ ability to reap the
benefits of their investments.
D. Securitization in Japan
1.  Background and Development.  After the tremendous success
of mortgage and other asset-backed securities in the United States,
markets around the world have begun to experiment with this
financing tool.169  Japanese government-sponsored committees began
researching the field of asset securitization in 1988.170  Two years
later, the Securities and Exchange Council, an organization
sponsored by the MOF, published its first report dealing with “the
legal and institutional improvements necessary to cope with asset
securitization” in Japan.171  Also in 1990, the first “quasi-
securitization” in Japan was accomplished by the nation’s railway
monopoly, Japan Railways.172
In 1992, a research group sponsored by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) published its own study on
securitization.173  Following that study, the Japanese Diet enacted the
Law Regarding Regulation of the Business Concerning Specified
the ABS will not be able to readily convert her security into cash via market transactions or
that she will be able to liquidate her holdings, but only at a substantial loss.
168. This niche of ABS may become more active in the near future, however, due to the
recent interest in the first-ever music royalty-backed securities offering, issued by David Bowie
in February of 1997.  See Wall Street Backs Bowie with $55 Million, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4,
1997, at 4; see also David Usborne, Money Is the New Rock’n’Roll as the Stars Take Bowie’s
Lead, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 1, 1997, at 5 (projecting that the entertainment industry
will be the next big market tapped by ABS innovators).
169. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1421-26.
170. See Kawachi, supra note 124, at 591.
171. Id.
172. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1425 n.289.  The transaction involved the
issuance of fifteen-year convertible bonds by an asset management company set up by the rail
monopoly.  See id.  The debt was convertible to fractional interests in the underlying assets of
the loans.  See id.
173. See Kawachi, supra note 124, at 591.
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Claims (the Specified Claims Law or SCL), which permitted limited
securitization of leases and credit card claims beginning in June
1993.174  Far from giving nonbank entities carte blanche to restructure
their balance sheets through innovative financing, the legislation
required lease and credit card companies to obtain MITI approval
before pooling and securitizing their assets, and MOF approval prior
to the ABS issuance.175  Nonetheless, the new legislation provided the
impetus for the first securitizations involving Japanese assets.  In the
vanguard was Nippon Shinpan, a consumer finance corporation
which in November of 1994 issued ¥15 billion (then $153 million)
worth of auto loan-backed securities in the U.S.176  One month later,
Japan Leasing, a leading lessor of industrial and computer equipment
in Japan, issued bonds in the U.S. backed by a pool of its lease
receivables.177
In response to the growth of securitization abroad and the
increasing rate at which Japanese companies were issuing ABS
offshore, in May of 1995 the MOF proposed a liberalization of the
financial markets that permitted financial institutions and certain
credit corporations to begin issuing asset-backed securities in Japan
commencing in 1996.178  This liberalization was intended to encourage
financial institutions to create domestic special purpose corporations
(yugen kaisha), which would acquire assets and issue securities.179
With the ball in motion, companies with valuable assets began to
take advantage of the MOF’s liberalization to issue asset-backed
securities in Japan.  After a successful first effort in the United
States, Nippon Shinpan completed its second securitization in March
of 1996.  This time, however, the ¥50 billion (then $473 million) worth
174. See id. at 591 n.33 (citing Tokutei Saiken Nado ni Kakaru Jigyo ni Kansuru Horitsu
[Law Regarding Regulation of the Business Concerning Specified Claims], Law No. 77 of
1992).  For a discussion of the provisions of this law, see id. at 591-604.
175. See Park, supra note 89, at 736.
176. See Japan’s Nippon Shinpan Re Enters Market, ASSET SALES REP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File.
177. See Laura Lorber, First Japanese Asset-Backed Deal to Debut in US This Week,
BONDWEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 1.  Japan Leasing completed a second deal worth ¥16 billion
($133 million) in May of 1996.  See Citi, JLS Complete Japanese ABCP Deal, ASSET SALES
REP., May 20, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, News library, Newltr File [hereinafter Citibank
Deal] (quoting the head of Citicorp’s Japanese securitization department: “These transactions
reflect the growth of the securitization market in Japan and the increasing recognition by
Japanese issuers of the corporate finance benefits associated with securitization.”).
178. See Christopher P. Wells & Richard D. Thieme, Japan: Legal Report, INT’L FIN. L.
REV 43, 44 (Oct. 1995) (discussing the deregulation of ABS issuances in Japan).
179. See id. at 44-45.
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of auto loan-backed securities were floated in the Tokyo market.180
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s each gave the offering its highest
rating,181 reflecting their utmost confidence in the SPV’s ability to pay
principal and interest on the securities.
A major development occurred in November of 1996, when
Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated a plan for massive reformation of
Japan’s financial system.182  The “Big Bang,”183 as it is called in Japan,
will attempt to create a “free, fair, and global” Japanese economy by
the year 2001.184  The swift resolution of the bad loan problem facing
Japanese banking institutions is a top priority of this initiative.185
Toward this end, the Big Bang proposed several measures that will
facilitate the securitization of bank assets.  These measures included
a legal provision that permits the creation of Special Purpose
Companies,186 which are the primary conduits of ABS,187 and an
authorization for banks to sell security investment trust certificates
(another common vehicle for ABS) without going through sub-
sidiaries.188  There have been several notable ABS transactions in
1997, indicating that the “Big Bang” is having a significant effect on
Japan’s financial markets.189  Moreover, the MOF and other govern-
180. See Japan’s Nippon Shinpan Re Enters Market, supra note 176.
181. See id. (reporting that both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s gave the securities a
triple-A rating).
182. See About the Financial System Reform (The Japanese Version of the Big Bang),
(visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb1.htm>.
183. Although the “Big Bang” originally referred to the astrological theory that the
universe was created out of a gigantic explosion, the term has subsequently been used to refer
to the massive top-down economic reform of the United Kingdom’s stock exchange, initiated in
1986.    See   The  Originator  of   the   Big   Bang,   England   (visited   Nov.   26,  1997)   <http://
www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb24.htm>.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See Anthony Rowley, Japan Govt Plans to Allow Securitisation of Land, BUS. TIMES
(Singapore), Mar. 25, 1997, Asia, at 10 (reporting on plans to allow the establishment of SPCs
that would take over foreclosed property and issue bonds to finance that takeover).  The term
SPC has the same meaning as the term SPV.  The MOF’s previous failure to allow SPVs in
Japan had been one of the main impediments to the growth of Japan’s ABS market. See
Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1424.
187. See Financial System Reform—Toward the Early Achievement of Reform (June 13,
1997) (visited Nov. 26, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb32.htm>.
188. See id.
189. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 9 tbl.1.  While such transactions appear
promising for the future of Japan’s ABS market, a strong secondary market in which to trade
the securities may take time to develop.  See Top Asian Lessors, supra note 30; see also MOF to
Consider Securitization of Bad Loans by Brokers, Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 22, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter MOF Considers Securitization]
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ment entities have now openly endorsed the securitization of land as
a viable means for dealing with some of the nonperforming debt
burdening the banking industry.190
The increasing presence of commercial paper, securitized
commercial and residential real estate mortgages, residential
mortgage trusts, bank loan securitizations, and other sophisticated
finance structures in Japan strongly corroborate reports of economic
deregulation.191  Although the markets for these products are
currently less developed than their counterparts in the United
(noting some of the harsh short-term effects on banks and the real estate industry as a result of
bad loan disposals).  The recent failures of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of Japan’s
commercial banks, and Yamaichi Securities Co., one of Japan’s “Big Four” securities firms, are
also evidence that free market measures of the Big Bang are transforming Japan’s banking
industry into a more Darwinian financial landscape.  See Strom, supra note 73; see also Peter
Landers, Men and Boys: Big Bang Separates Strong from the Weak in Japan, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sep. 25, 1997, at 153 (discussing the weakening of Japan’s “convoy” system, in which the
“large banks move together like trucks in a convoy”).
190. See Jusen Loan Trade, supra note 5; Rowley, supra note 186; The Comprehensive
Package  to  Stimulate  Real  Estate  Liquidity   (visited  Nov.  26, 1997)   <http://www.mof.go.jp/
english/big-bang/ebb29.htm>.  A government Tax Commission recently suggested that the
government promote securitization of land assets via tax reforms in order to help institutions
relieve their bad loan problems.  See Panel Suggests Cut in Corporate Tax to ‘U.S. Level’, Japan
Economic Newswire, Dec. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.  Yasunari
Ohtsuka, manager of the financial engineering division of Fuji Bank, expects Fuji Bank to
market financial products that include bad loans, but fears that presently “there are still some
hurdles to expanding securitization of bad loans.”  Kazunari Yokota, Banks Turning to
Securitization to Improve Ratios, NIKKEI WKLY. (Japan), Oct. 6, 1997, at 1 (quoting Yasunari
Ohtsuka).
191. Several recent reports submitted by the Japanese government also evidence Japan’s
renewed campaign for economic and financial reform. See Coordination Bureau, Economic
Planning Agency, Japanese Government, Economic Outlook and Basic Policy Stance on
Economic Management for FY 1997, in THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: RECENT TRENDS AND
OUTLOOK 1997, at 25-30 (1997); see also Coordination Bureau, Economic Planning Agency,
Japanese Government, Structural Reform in Six Areas, in THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: RECENT
TRENDS AND OUTLOOK 1997, supra, at 50, 57-60 (stating government’s intention to
“implement drastic and comprehensive reform . . . by the end of the 20th century”).  Moreover,
prominent individuals both inside and outside of Japan have openly endorsed further
deregulation of Japan’s financial system and the development of securitization.  See, e.g.,
Corrigan Urges Japanese Banks’ Fast Disposal of Bad Loans, Japan Economic Newswire, Sept.
24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (quoting the chairman of Goldman,
Sachs, and Co., who urged the Japanese banks to promote securitization and liquidation of
problem loans to improve their health); Top Asian Lessors, supra note 30 (pushing for the
development of asset securitization by the Bank of Japan); Top Banker Pledges to Recover
Credibility in Banks, Japan Economic Newswire, July 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US File (quoting Shunsaku Hashimoto, Chairman of the Federation of Bankers
Association of Japan, who endorsed credit securitization options and further deregulation).
The head of the HLAC, Kohei Nakabo, appears ready to pursue securitization of some of the
assets the HLAC acquired from the failed jusen.  See Agencies Charged with Recovering Bad
Loans Need to Move Aggressively, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 9, 1996, at 6.
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States,192 these economic and financial trends signal the coming of a
full-fledged ABS market in Japan.  The jusen bad loan crisis presents
an opportunity to further develop Japan’s ABS market by
securitizing the nonperforming loans and collateral formerly held by
jusen.193
2.  Potential Obstacles to Securitization in Japan.  While issuers,
investors, and taxpayers may be prepared to embrace an ABS market
in Japan, the combination of restrictive securities laws, inter-
ministerial conflicts, and cultural barriers may impede realization of
that goal.  This section discusses some of the factors that have
traditionally impeded the full development of an ABS market in
Japan; with the Big Bang still in a formative stage, it is unclear which
of these barriers will be eliminated and which will remain.
The Japanese securities industry is regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Law (SEL) of 1948.194  Article 65 of the SEL maintains
a separation of commercial banking and investment banking
activities, as the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act does in the United States;195
thus only securities firms may sell ABS in Japan.196  This restriction
has prevented Japanese banks from restructuring their balance sheets
by issuing loan or other asset-backed securities.  The 1992 Financial
192. See Kawachi, supra note 124, at 591; see also Yokota, supra note 190 (“Securitization
of bank loans is far more advanced in the U.S. than in Japan.”)
193. Hoping to take advantage of the MOF’s desire to encourage a market in Japan’s bad
debt, two foreign banks have formed alliances with major Japanese banks.  Bankers Trust New
York teamed up with Nippon Credit Bank and Swiss Bank formed an alliance with the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan.  See Bremner et al., supra note 8, at 122.
194. See Park, supra note 89, at 740 n.119 (citing Shoken Torihiki Ho [Securities and
Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948 [hereinafter SEL], reprinted in Japanese Laws Relating to
Securities and Exchange & Foreign Securities Dealer, IV Law Bull. (Series Japan (EHS) MA
51 (1987) [hereinafter Japanese Laws]).
195. See Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, §§ 5, 11(a), 20-21, 32, 48 Stat. 162,
181, 188-89, 194 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 335, 374a, 377-78).  While the Glass-
Steagall Act continues to statutorily separate commercial banking and investment banking, in
late 1996 the Federal Reserve relaxed some of the regulations enforcing that separation.  See
Anita Raghavan, Walls Fall Down: Bankers Trust Agrees to Buy Alex, Brown as Merger Blitz
Grows, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1997, at A1.  Specifically, the Federal Reserve raised the cap on
banks’ corporate underwriting from 10% to 25% of their securities affiliates’ revenues.  See id.
This relaxation allowed many banks to merge with investment banks, including the $1.7 billion
merger of Bankers Trust New York Corp. with investment bank Alex, Brown Inc.  See id.
Some industry observers have commented that the transaction sounded the “death-knell” of
the Glass-Steagall Act.  See Edmund M. Remondino, Glass-Steagall: Dead at Last?, CONN. L.
TRIB., Dec. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Clt file.
196. See SEL, supra note 194, art. 65, reprinted in Japanese Laws, supra note 194, at 42.
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Reform Law197 attempted to reduce the severity of Article 65 by
allowing banks to form subsidiaries that could deal in securities, but
restrictions on some of the activities of the subsidiaries deflated their
appeal.198
On its face, the SEL’s definition of a “security”199 excluded most
types of instruments typically issued in a securitization.  Therefore,
with limited exceptions, ABS could not be issued or traded on the
securities exchanges in Japan.200  The Financial Reform Law of 1992,
however, “expanded the definition of security to include commercial
paper, certificates of deposit issued outside of Japan, foreign
securitized credit card receivables, and mortgage-backed trust
certificates.”201  A 1995 agreement between the Japanese and United
States governments proposed that asset-backed financial products be
incorporated into the definition of a “security” under the SEL.202
This agreement should facilitate securitization of Japanese assets in
the future.
Conflicts between MITI and the MOF, the two most powerful
economic ministries in Japan, have also been a significant factor in
197. See Park, supra note 89, at 740 n.126 (citing Kinyu Seido Oyobi Shoken Torihiki Seido
no Kaikaku no Tame no Kankei Horitsu no Seibito ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law to Provide for the
Reform of the Financial and Securities Trading Systems], Law No. 87 of 1992 [hereinafter
Financial Reform Law]).
198. See id. at 740-41 (observing that the Japanese restrictions separated “those with the
ability to market and [to] sell ABS, the securities firms, from those with the greatest need to
issue ABS, the banks”).
199. See SEL, supra note 194, art. 2, § 1, reprinted in Japanese Laws, supra note 194, at 2
(enumerating the only instruments defined as “securities” in Japan).
The SEL defines a security as one of the following items: (1) government debt
security; (2) municipal debt security; (3) debt security issued under a special statute
by a corporation; (4) secured or unsecured debt security issued by a business
corporation; (5) stock issued by a corporation organized under a special statute; (6)
stock and warrant issued by a business corporation; (7) beneficial certificate under a
securities investment trust or loan trust; (8) a promissory note issued by a
corporation for funding for its business, as designated by MOF regulation; (9)
security or certificate issued by a foreign government or foreign corporation that has
the characteristics of the security or certificate listed in (1)-(7) above; (10) a security
or certificate issued by a foreign corporation that represents a beneficiary trust
interest or similar interest in loans by a bank or any other lending institution, as
designated by MOF regulation; and (11) any other security or certificate designated
by cabinet order as necessary to ensure the public interest or investor protection,
with consideration given to its transferability and other conditions.
Kawachi, supra note 124, at 593 n.37.
200. See Park, supra note 89, at 742-43.
201. Id. at 743; see also supra note 197.
202. See Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji Itoh,  Japanese Asset Securitization: A Guide for
Practitioners, 38 HARV. INT’L  L.J. 171, 195 (1997).
FELSON 07/06/98  9:05 AM
1997] SECURITIZATION IN JAPAN 597
slowing financial and legal reform regarding securitization.203 Under
the MITI’s watchful eye, leasing and financing companies have
sought to lessen their dependence on traditional credit financing by
securitizing leases and other receivables.204  The MOF, on the other
hand, is charged with regulating financial institutions, such as banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies.205  Each seeks to keep the
emerging field of securitization within its own jurisdiction.206  Because
securitization transactions often involve the services of investment
bankers in structuring and placing the asset-backed issues, and since
these banks are within the domain of the MOF, it is difficult for
nonbanks to structure deals so that they are not subject to MOF
regulation.207
One of the essential components to any securitization
transaction is the ability of the originator to transfer its assets to an
independent entity in order to separate the risk of the originator
from the risk of the assets.  In the United States, such transfers and
sales of assets are facilitated by the fact that the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) does not explicitly require originators to
provide notice to obligors.  In contrast, secured lending laws in Japan
require originators to give notice to obligors before transferring or
assigning any assets.208  Moreover, the typical debtor-creditor
relationship in Japan often involves a significant amount of personal
contact nurtured over a period of years.209  Japanese banks, therefore,
may be reluctant to sell off their loans for fear of alienating their
corporate clients.210
203. See Park, supra note 89, at 741-42.
204. See id. at 741.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 738; Shimada & Itoh, supra note 202, at 179, 192 (referring to requirements
under Article 467 of the Japanese Civil Code and the Money Lenders Laws).
209. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
210. See Park, supra note 89, at 738.  Shimada & Itoh discuss two responses to this problem
employed by practitioners in Japan.  See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 202, at 180.  One response
is to elicit the obligor’s advance consent to future transfers at the origination of the receivable.
See id.  Alternatively, “several written consents may be bound together in a manner that
minimizes the risk that they will be separated from each other, and the kakutei hizuke [certified
date] certificate may be affixed to the cover page of this bound group of consents or notices.”
Id.  Moreover, the Ministry of Justice of Japan is reported to be considering the
implementation of a perfection system similar to the UCC system of filing financing statements
in the United States.  See id. at 183-84.
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Another problem with securitizing the assets of a bank or
corporation is the issue of “setoff.”  Setoff in its most basic form is
the cancellation of cross demands.211  For example, a debt owed by A
to B may be satisfied by simultaneously discharging a debt owed to A
from B.  In the United States, banks can use account deposits to
setoff overdue loans made to their depositors.212  When securitized
assets are used to setoff claims of creditors, the SPV may face
substantial risks of delay or default on its payments to investors.
Even a true sale of assets to the SPV does not preclude creditors
from setting off their claims against the securitized assets.213  One
method of insulating the assets of the SPV from the risk of setoff is to
procure a waiver from the bank in which the SPV’s proceeds are kept
and, as appropriate, from third party obligors who may also have
claims against the SPV’s assets.214  Similarly, the prospect that jusen
or other nonperforming assets transferred to an SPV would be used
to setoff claims by creditors is a risk that could greatly complicate the
pricing, placement, and pay-off of “jusen securities.”
Finally, some lawyers and bankers have expressed concern over
the nontransparency in Japanese financial reporting.215  Since
Japanese accounting rules allow wide flexibility in the manner in
which financial conditions are presented, financial statements of
banks and corporations may not provide sufficient disclosure of
information pertinent to investment decisions and to securities
valuation.  Within the context of asset securitization, however,
nontransparency only poses a problem when meaningful due
diligence cannot be performed directly on the assets to be securitized.
For example, if the securitized assets are real estate properties and
related loans on which investors can do their own due diligence and
cash flow analysis, the misleading disclosures are largely irrelevant.
In contrast, if a bank desires to securitize loans made to a corporation
211. See Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 51, 51 (1988).  For a discussion of the history of the setoff doctrine
see William H. Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916).
212. See Sepinuck, supra note 211, at 54.  In the bankruptcy context, setoff effectively
permits a creditor to recover a greater portion of his claim and in a more timely fashion than
other creditors.  See id. at 56 n.20.  Such setoff of claims is only permitted, however, to the
extent that the debtor incurred the debt within 90 days of filing for bankruptcy.  See Hideki
Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities,  80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2146 (1994).
213. Interview with Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law at Duke University School of
Law, in Durham, N.C. (Jan. 15, 1998).
214. Id.
215. Those interviewed requested that their comments be kept anonymous.
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about which there is no meaningful disclosure, then lack of
transparency would be a problem since investors must rely on the
company to provide the information necessary for valuation.  Thus,
the nature of the assets securitized will determine the significance of
the deficient disclosure.
III. SECURITIZATION OF JUSEN ASSETS216
The two foremost concerns of financial institutions plagued by
nonperforming loans are the removal of these bad loans from their
balance sheets and the procurement of new capital.  Securitization of
jusen assets, namely loan and real estate portfolios, would partially
address217 both of these concerns; it would also help to bolster the real
estate market, to stabilize the stock market, and to popularize asset
securitization in Japan.  Although these last macroeconomic benefits
should not impact a particular institution’s decision to securitize its
assets, they should inform the Japanese government’s decision to
endorse and facilitate securitization through continued financial
reform and monetary support.  This section discusses the desirability
and feasibility of securitizing jusen assets.
A.  Securitization is a Desirable Solution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
1.  Costs of Securitizing Jusen Assets.  Securitization should be
attempted only after an extensive comparison has been made
between the costs and benefits of securitized and alternative sources
of funding.218  The most significant costs associated with securitization
216. This section is a theoretical analysis of the financial and legal viability and desirability
of securitizing the nonperforming debt of former jusen.  For a more extensive discussion of
specific issues involved in Japanese securitization from the perspective of two practitioners in
the field, see Shimada & Itoh, supra note 202.
217. As a senior analyst at Moody’s points out: “Securitization should not be viewed as a
cure for current bad loans.  Instead, it is a partial solution . . . .” See Moody’s Upbeat on Japan’s
Real-Estate Securitization, Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US File (quoting Ben Bystrom, Senior Analyst, Moody’s Investors Service).
218. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 154.  Professor Schwarcz advises that, “[a]
company considering securitization should compare (i) the expected differential between
interest payable on non-securitized financing and interest payable on securities issued by an
applicable SPV with (ii) the expected difference in transaction costs between the alternative
funding options.”  Id. at 137-38.  Schwarcz also points out that if the securitization transaction
will be achieved “off-balance sheet,” then a strict debt-to-debt comparison may understate the
benefits involved because of the inherent advantages in such off-balance sheet structures.  See
id. at 138 n.18.
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are those paid for letters of credit, surety bonds, or other such credit
enhancements required to assure investors that the ABS will pay the
commensurate return.  Fees for such credit enhancements take
between 75 to 150 basis points (bp)219 from the originator’s expected
return.220  Underwriter’s fees and annual reporting and accounting
costs are also substantial, reducing the originator’s pie by 40-100bp
and 20-35bp respectively.221  In addition, when the securities are
placed in the private market, investors typically require a liquidity
premium on the order of 10-20bp.222
In addition to these direct costs, there are indirect expenses
associated with each securitization structure.223  For example,
Professor Steven Schwarcz notes that there are costs associated with
the “true sale” requirement necessary to achieve bankruptcy-
remoteness.224  These costs result from the originator225 having to
“limit, if not forego, its right to the residual value of the receivables
sold to the SPV . . . . Such  ‘overcollateralization’ is needed to assure
investors and providers of liquidity and credit enhancement that they
will not suffer losses from delayed collection or defaults.”226  The
issuers must weigh these transaction-specific costs with the proposed
benefits of securitization.  Significantly, some of these costs may be
mitigated if issuers are able to generate economies of scale from their
enormous portfolios of securitizable debt.
2.  Benefits of Securitizing Jusen Assets.  Financial institutions
currently have few ways to eliminate nonperforming loans from their
balance sheets:227 They either may choose to write them off, sell them
to one of the dissolution agencies, or sell/auction them off at deep
discounts to large institutions that specialize in distressed assets.228
219. A basis point represents one-hundredth of a percentage point.  For example, a yield
rise from 8.25% to 9.00% represents a 75 basis point increase.  See RADCLIFFE, supra note 136,
at 31.
220. See BIRD, supra note 72, at 159.  
221. See id. at 160-61.
222. See id. at 160.
223. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 141-42.
224. See id. at 147.
225. In this case, the originator would be the banks or dissolution agencies that hold the
former jusen assets.
226. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 141.
227. See Park, supra note 89, at 729 n.43.
228. The RTC was quite successful in selling large blocks of real estate formerly held by
S&Ls to funds which developed the properties and re-sold them at handsome profits.  See infra
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Securitization provides an alternative.  It creates the ability to sell off
large blocks of bad loans to a trust or to an SPV.  With the proceeds
from the sale, the originator can pay down its liabilities and improve
its financial ratios.229
The effect of reducing nonperforming debt is twofold.  First,
with stronger capital-to-assets ratios, originators would be able to
secure a lower cost of financing.230  Securitizing their bad loans would
enable banks to tap the capital markets and thus operate with a more
attractive cost of capital.  Second, the potential for off-balance sheet
financing through an appropriate securitization structure would
facilitate compliance with the capital requirements of the Basle
Accord.231
Securitization may also provide originators with a new source of
capital.  Presently, Japanese banks are scaling back loans due to their
fear that they may lack the funds to pay depositors.232  As new Big
Bang measures become effective in April of 1998, banks with low
capital adequacy will be forced to either strengthen their balance
sheets by injecting new capital or close down their operations.233
These stricter regulatory standards may create a “capital crunch” in
Japan’s banking industry.  The situation may be further complicated
for those crunched for capital by the fact that lending practices in
Japan are often the product of years of relationship building.234  As a
result, clients of collapsed lenders may face the near impossible task
of securing credit from new private lenders.235  Since the capital
markets rely more heavily on economics than they do on
relationships, Japanese institutions can utilize securitization to tap
notes 276-77 and accompanying text.  Banks that engage in such discounted sales lose the
potential upside from effective development of their assets through means such as
securitization.
229. See Yokota, supra note 190 (reporting that international banks are securitizing loans to
keep capital-to-asset ratios above 8%, as required by the Bank for International Settlements);
see also Park, supra note 89, at 729 (discussing the benefits of improved financial ratios).
Furthermore, if structured properly, the banks or other originators could reap the benefits of
excess cashflows on the receivables transferred to the SPV, which they could not do if the assets
were sold directly to institutions.
230. See Park, supra note 89, at 729.
231. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
232. See Steven Pearlstein, In Tokyo’s Case, Crisis Sprang from an Excess of Riches, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1997, at C15.
233. See Abrahams & Tett, supra note 16 (quoting a senior Japanese government official:
“What we are seeing is not just a credit crunch, but a capital crunch.”).
234. See Chandler, supra note 8.
235. See id.
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the public sector, supplying them with the capital necessary to
operate in Japan’s new, more demanding, financial milieu.236
In addition to these microeconomic benefits for originators, a
large-scale securitization of nonperforming assets would also inject
confidence and renew interest in Japan’s real estate and stock
markets.  The real estate market would benefit as special purpose
companies purchase real estate collateral on defaulted loans from
creditors, causing prices to ride up the demand curve.  The SPCs
would fund these purchases by issuing trust certificates or bonds to
capital market investors, who would get paid by the income stream
from the properties.237  This new capital flowing into the market
through SPC or Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)238 conduits
would increase liquidity in the market, which would also serve to
stimulate prices.239  The management expertise and efficiency of large
companies is another reason given for increases in property values
following large real estate acquisitions.240
236. In efforts to improve its capital position, Sumitomo Bank, Japan’s second largest bank,
recently made a $1.8 billion preferred-stock offering which was quickly consumed by investors
eager to earn the 9.4% yield.  See Gregory Zuckerman & Craig Karmin, U.S. Investors Scoop
Up Offer by Sumitomo, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at C1.  Other Japanese banks are expected
to follow Sumitomo’s lead.  See id.  One New York practitioner involved in the Japanese
market believes that these visits to the capital markets suggest that “Japanese banks do not
want the strings attached to accepting government money, and are willing to pay 400 bp [basis
points] over U.S. Treasuries for that luxury.”  Telephone Interview with Paul D. Leake,
Partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in New York (Feb. 6, 1998).  In addition, some
Japanese banks are securitizing performing loans through collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions in the international capital markets.  Id.
237. See Howard C. Gelbtuch & Takashi Kataoka, Real Estate Securitization Gaining Favor
in France & Japan, REAL ESTATE ISSUES, Aug. 1997, at 1, 1-7 (describing the benefits of the
SPC vehicle).
238. REITs, or Real Estate Investment Trusts, were formed in the 1960s as “vehicles to
hold or finance real estate and to offer tax advantages to investors.”  Richard Marchitelli &
James R. MacCrate, REITS and the Private Market: Are Comparisons Meaningful?, REAL
ESTATE ISSUES, Aug. 1996, at 7, 7-10 (explaining the origin and benefits of the REIT
structure).  The growth of the REIT market has been phenomenal in the United States and is
expected to continue.  See J. Linn Allen, Zell Leads, Rides Real Estate Revolution, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 7, 1997, at N1.
239. See Top Lender Survey, National Real Estate Investor, Oct. 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Mags File (quoting Ethan Penner of Nomura Asset Capital, who maintains that
liquidity in the United States real estate market improved as a result of increased capital
market use of real-estate backed securities); MOF Considers Securitization, supra note 189; cf.
1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 3.3.3 (noting that “[l]iquidity can entice investors to trade rather
than invest long-term for income.”).
240. See Allen, supra note 237; Steve Bailey & Steve Syre, Beacon Deal Seen Reflecting
Shift in Boston Real Estate, Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1997, at D1 (“Scale will allow
economies of operation and provide the kind of liquidity that will attract new investors.”).
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The stock market should also benefit from increases in ABS
issuances backed by former jusen assets.241  One theory is that the
securitization of low-quality assets would obviate the need for banks
to issue new shares to strengthen their capital base.242  New issues
result in the dilution of existing shares, causing stock prices to fall.
Furthermore, Japan’s credit crunch has forced some companies to
sell portions of their equity holdings,243 producing downward pressure
on stock prices.  However, if banks issue ABS securities instead of
selling stocks to earn the capital required by MOF and Basle Accord
guidelines then the stock market should experience less downward
pressure on prices.
B.  Securitization of Jusen Assets is Feasible: Criteria Necessary For
Securitization
If a cost-benefit analysis reveals that securitization would be a
promising financial alternative for jusen assets, the next step is to
analyze the feasibility of such a structure.  The factors that are crucial
to this inquiry fall into three basic categories: 1) the quality of the
originator; 2) the quality of the obligors; and 3) the nature of the
assets.
1.  Quality of the Originator.  Since ABS are usually rated triple-
A with an ability to withstand as much as a five-fold rise in default
rates, investors have historically been most concerned with the
collateral behind and the structure of a deal.244  However, there are a
number of reasons why the quality of the originator should be given
equal if not greater weight in an investor’s analysis.245
The originator or issuer of the ABS plays a key role in servicing
the asset pools.  Accordingly, the investors rely heavily on the
originator of the securitized assets to channel the cash flows from the
assets to the SPV or directly to the security holders.  The issuer must
convince the ABS market as well as the rating agencies of its
commitment and ability to make the assets perform.  Since debt
241. See MOF Considers Securitization, supra note 189 (claiming that asset securitization
would be a stabilizing force in the Japanese stock market).
242. See id.
243. See Abrahams & Tett, supra note 16.
244. See Gregory Zuckerman, Asset-Backed Securities Face New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb.
18, 1997, at C25.
245. See id. (discussing investors’ changing emphasis on the issuers of ABS in light of recent
issuer defaults).
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collection and enforcement requires a unique set of skills not
possessed by corporations generally,246 the originator may increase
the attractiveness of its issuance by transferring the servicing function
to reliable specialists.247  Moreover, investors can also rely on back-up
servicers to perform such functions in the case of an issuer
bankruptcy.248
The primary holders of jusen debt are large Japanese banks and
government-sponsored dissolution agencies.  In order to gain the
confidence of ABS investors, these entities should join forces with
those who specialize in the restructuring and servicing of distressed
debt and properties.  Nippon Credit Bank has already formed such a
partnership with Bankers Trust.249  An alternative to such joint
ventures would be to simply sell off large blocks of the debt to
experienced ABS players.  Goldman, Sachs, for example, is expected
to spend as much as $4 billion to purchase distressed loans from
troubled banks.250
2.  Quality of the Obligors.  An obligor’s delay in making
payments (slow pay) or its default on payments (no pay)251 will
directly affect investors’ return on their investments.  Consequently,
the pool must contain a sufficiently large number of assets to create a
statistically high probability that the payments will be made on time
even if some obligors delay or default.252  If the required pool size
cannot be created statistically to assure payment, liquidity facilities253
may be used to provide the “fill-in funds” to the issuer to meet its
obligations in the event of slow pay.  In effect, these facilities make
short-term loans to the issuer; however, if simple delays turn into
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., Delilah Brummet Flaum & George A. Pecoulas, Securitizing Health Care
Receivables: Legal and Structural Issues, COM. LENDING REV., Spring 1995, at 45, 49
(explaining the importance of a “sound reputation and an established track record” in selecting
a servicer of receivables in the health care industry).
248. See Zuckerman, supra note 243, at C25 (quoting Tracy van Eck, head of ABS
Research at Bear Stearns, “If a bank goes under, a backup servicer is . . . readily available.”).
249. See supra note 193.
250. See Oliver August & Janet Bush, Goldman Has $4 bn to Spend on Japanese Loan
Portfolios, TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 1997, at 15; Patrick McGeehan, Japan’s Bad Loans
Attract Interest of Goldman Sachs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1997, at C15 (reporting that the
investment bank recently completed major purchases of loans from Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
Ltd. and Sumitomo Bank Ltd.).
251. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 5.
252. See id.
253. See supra note 157.
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larger-than-expected defaults, the ultimate risk is borne by the issuer
or credit enhancement facility.254
With billions of dollars of commercial and private loans,
effective pooling of the former jusen assets should minimize the
effects of obligor defaults, assuring timely payments to investors.
Nevertheless, further defaults will occur.  The impact of default by
these obligors can be reduced by securitizing the nonperforming
loans of a large number of borrowers.255  In creating pools, the issuer
should also consider the financial health of the obligors and any
defenses to payment that they may claim.  After analyzing the
various risk levels and payment histories of the particular obligors,
specialists can form pools that provide predictable cash flows and
attractive risk-reward levels.  As long as the return increases with the
level of risk, there will be investors willing to buy the ABS.256
More significant than the actual (default or slow pay) risk is the
ability to accurately predict what the risk will be.  If the risk can be
accurately predicted, then pricing257 and credit enhancement can be
properly managed and the assets successfully securitized.258
Government guarantees259 could also be employed to insulate
investors from any substantial devaluation of the bad loan-backed
securities that may result from unexpectedly large defaults or
changes in the market.  The government may look to the long-term
benefits of a liquid ABS market, the invigoration of real estate prices,
and a final resolution of the jusen crisis as justification for absorbing
a portion of the costs of these safeguards.
3.  Nature of the Assets.  In order to entice investors to purchase
asset-backed securities, issuers must assure investors that principal
254. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 5.
255. Cf. supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing the risk-reducing benefits of
diversification).
256. Implicit here is the assumption that sufficient credit enhancement as well as increased
institutional transparency reform would be required before investors would purchase such
securities.
257. For a discussion of ABS pricing, see SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note
21, at 6.
258. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 135.
259. Such guarantees would act as subsidies to the ABS market; over the long-run, these
subsidies are likely to be far less costly than an entirely government-supported clean-up of the
bad loan problem.  In reality, however, the government would likely not agree to guarantee
specific issuances of “jusen securities” unless it had more control over the underlying assets.
Such control could be accomplished through government purchases of bank shares.  But see
supra note 236.
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and interest will be paid at some predictable rate.  This predictability
is important to investors from the standpoint of return on investment;
it is also necessary to price the securities accurately.  If securities are
offered without an established time of repayment, their proper value
cannot be assessed and investors will not purchase them.
The predictability of cash flows is a function of the type or
nature of the receivables and market conditions.  If, for example, a
credit card company extends credit to a cardholder for a consumer
purchase, the obligor will have few defenses to payment since the
originator has fully performed its part of the bargain.260  However,
consider the problem if the originator is a franchisor that contracts
with a franchisee to provide franchise rights and products in
exchange for a fee.  In the event of a franchisor bankruptcy, the
franchisee will be less likely to continue making payments since the
originator will be unable to continue its part of the bargain.261
Therefore, transactions involving a continuing relationship between
the originator and the obligor are more likely to result in defaulting
obligors than when the transaction is a separate and completed one
such as the credit card scenario.
The jusen bad loans are more analogous to the credit card
scenario than to the franchise contract.  Of the total loans
outstanding by the defunct jusen, approximately 82% represented
loans to businesses and 18% were loans to individuals for private
home purchases.262  Since jusen had performed their part of the loan
contract in extending credit, defenses to payment should be
substantially reduced.  Despite the fact that approximately 75% of
the total jusen lending has been deemed nonperforming,263 banks and
others holding jusen debt can still profit by developing or liquidating
the collateral securing these loans.  By securitizing that collateral or
the loans themselves, the holders of these assets will avoid having to
wait for the anticipated resurrection of the Japanese real estate
260. This is true irrespective of the solvency of the credit card company.
261. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 21, at 7-9 (discussing the
predictability of future payment in executory contracts such as franchise agreements).  The
bargain includes more than merely the supply of products and services.  The essential value
supplied by the franchisor to the franchisee is the goodwill associated with the franchise name.
When the franchisor files for bankruptcy it spoils the name, goodwill, and, therefore, the value
of the franchisee’s contract.
262. See Aritake, supra note 11.
263. See id.
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market, and will instead reap an earlier harvest with the proceeds of
their ABS issuances.
The location of the real estate securing jusen bad loans is also a
significant factor in the success of this securitization effort.  The
majority of the collateral is located in Tokyo, Osaka, and other large
cities.264  With the Japanese economy gaining strength, the properties
located in these major cities will be the first to benefit from increased
liquidity and development in the real estate market.  Signs of
deregulation coupled with improvement in key economic factors will
also facilitate the successful securitization of jusen assets.
One obstacle to securitizing the real estate portfolios of jusen is
that much of the collateral is small and scattered, making the
properties less attractive to commercial developers.265  Moreover, the
track record for such asset conversion is not very good.  For example,
of the $124 billion worth of bad loans transferred to the Cooperative
Credit Purchasing Company in 1993, only $5.4 billion had been sold
by September 1996.266 And in the 17 months before it became the
Resolution Collection Bank, Tokyo Kyodou collected only about
10% of the $800 million worth of loans inherited from three failed
institutions.267  Such uncertainty will decrease the predictability of the
securities payments and may inhibit ABS sales in the short term.  A
March 1997 government package easing land regulations, however,
may significantly aid in the efforts by banks and others to develop
these scattered tracts of land.268
Investors and guarantors will also require extensive asset-
specific information before making large investments in ABS,
especially when such securities are backed by presently
nonperforming assets.269  In an effort to begin providing such
264. See Steps Eyed to Sell Land Held as Bad Loan Collateral, Japan Economic Newswire,
Oct. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
265. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18; Profit in Jusen Loans, supra note 108.
266. See Choy, Marshaling Forces, supra note 18.
267. See id.
268. See Property Liquidity Package Released, Jiji Press Ticker Serv., Mar. 31, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News File.
269. Disclosure of all information relevant to an investment decision is particularly crucial
in Japan due to the historic absence of securities laws designed to protect investors from
securities fraud. Interview with James D. Cox, Professor of Law at Duke University School of
Law, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 3, 1998).  United States securities laws, by comparison, are
premised on the notion of “full disclosure” in order to protect investors.  See JAMES D. COX ET
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 45-60 (1991) (describing American disclosure requirements);
see also Moody’s Upbeat on Japan’s Real-Estate Securitization, supra note 217 (discussing the
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necessary information, the government has said it will create a
database on collateral property held by banks.270  This should
precipitate further data collection and comparisons in the real estate
market as well as aid originators in their attempts to securitize land
and loan assets.  Lowering the cost of acquiring such information will
facilitate securitization deals.271  Since the pools of jusen assets
contain large numbers of small loans, information costs about the
quality of the assets will be relatively high.272  Therefore, in order to
price and securitize these pools more easily, the loan contracts may
need to be rewritten using more standard and simple terms to
provide investors a predictable assessment of the securities’ cash flow
and maturities.273
Market conditions will also affect the precise rate at which
investors are paid their principal and interest.  For example, if
interest rates substantially decline, mortgagees will probably
refinance their mortgages at lower rates.  This refinancing would
jeopardize the future stream of cash flows to the banks at the
previously higher interest levels.  Substantial prepayments in a pool
of mortgages may greatly affect the timing and predictability of
payments.274  However, with interest rates currently at rock-bottom in
Japan, there is virtually no risk of prepayment of mortgage loans
made by jusen.
C.  Securitized Jusen Loans Would Be Attractive to Investors
1.  Return, Customization and Diversification.  Opponents of
jusen securitization have remarked that the Japanese capital markets
may lack investors willing to buy debt backed by nonperforming
loans.275  While securities backed by nonperforming assets may be
need for disclosure of accurate information to allow the market to monitor the underlying real
estate assets).
270. See Property Liquidity Package Released, supra note 268.
271. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 114, § 2.7.
272. See id. (making this point about pooled loans generally).
273. See id. (discussing the benefits of “standard and simple terms”).  This, however, could
be administratively and economically unfeasible considering the thousands of contracts that
may need to be re-written in any given pool of loans.  Prospectively, lawyers should write new
loan contracts with an eye toward future sales and securitizations.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
275. See, e.g., Profit in Jusen Loans, supra note 108 (quoting Yuri Okina, a senior
economist at the Japan Research Institute, arguing that securitized debt backed by
nonperforming loans will not find an interested audience in Japan).
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risky, the reward factor associated with deeply discounted bad loans,
coupled with aggressive development of the collateral, could be
enormous.  The investment philosophy of buying assets during deep
depressions in value was widely embraced after the Savings and Loan
debacle.276  The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was enormously
successful at selling large blocks of real estate loans and collateral at
bargain prices, which entrepreneurial investors turned into big
gains.277  Similarly, jusen securitization would offer investors an
opportunity to profit as the real estate backing their securities
appreciates as a result of development programs and an overall
upswing in the Japanese economy.
As the price of the ABS will be crucial to enticing purchasers,
part of the originator’s cost savings in structuring the ABS must be
passed on to investors in the form of higher interest rates.  The
appropriate level of interest for the debt instrument will often be a
function of the credit rating that it receives.278  While the major
United States rating agencies are frequently employed to rate cross-
border or exclusively foreign-based transactions,279 there are also
Japanese agencies which rate ABS transactions in Japan.280
In rating an ABS offering, the agencies will need to consider a
variety of country-specific, deal-specific, and collateral-specific
factors.281  Such factors may include the bankruptcy-remoteness of the
issuer, the likelihood of substantive consolidation, property title
issues, the priority of the mortgage securing the indebtedness,
liquidity structures, sovereign risk, and the relative strength of the
currency (if applicable).282  The ABS investors will therefore rely
upon such ratings to determine the minimum return they will accept.
276. Real estate development of distressed properties was commonly practiced following
the S&L debacle by so-called “vulture funds” which allied institutional investors with real-
estate specialists.  See id.
277. See id.
278. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 21, at 136.  On rating agencies generally, see
Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1399-403; see also BIRD, supra note 72, at 140 (listing
factors considered by rating agencies).
279. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 2, 9 tbl.1.  In the twelve-month period ending
June 30, 1997, S&P rated 49 asset-backed transactions in Japan and 14 among Thailand,
Indonesia, Korea, and Hong Kong.  See id.
280. Nippon Investors Service and the Japan Bond Research Institute are two domestic
rating bodies.  See Yokota, supra note 190 (noting the involvement of Nippon Investors Service
in a Fall 1997 securitization by Fuji Bank).
281. See S&P CRITERIA, supra note 115, at 11 (describing the process by which S&P rates
structured finance transactions).
282. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1402.
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In addition to the credit rating’s importance in pricing the ABS, it
also serves to offer investors confidence in the securities’ ability to
pay the stated interest rate and to repay principal.
Customized transaction structures also provide a way for
creative lawyers and corporations to entice investors.283  For example,
originators with nonperforming assets could make bad loan-linked
securities more attractive by offering senior and subordinated debt
securities to better match the various risk tolerances of target
investors.  In this way, more risk-averse investors could purchase
senior ABS with lower interest rates and lower risk, while the risk-
preferring investors could purchase riskier subordinated issues with
the prospect of higher returns.  Allocating the risk of asset pools
would allow originators to increase potential investors and expand
their capital base.  Moreover, the recent media attention to Japan’s
bad loan crisis and the government’s efforts to structure a “bailout”
will also help to legitimize jusen securities.
Securities backed by jusen assets may have appeal beyond
Japanese investors.  American or European investors looking to
diversify their portfolios by investing in Japan may be attracted to
jusen loan-backed instruments because they present a cheaper or
safer investment opportunity than the notoriously expensive, volatile,
and historically restricted (to foreigners) Japanese stock market.284
Moreover, as Japan’s market for all kinds of ABS expands, foreign
corporations that have exhausted their domestic fundraising and
liquidity capabilities will benefit from accessing the enormous
resources of the Japanese capital markets to raise needed cash and to
improve liquidity.285
283. Cf. id. at 1403 n.167.  
A securitized structure is generally more flexible than other financing structures both
at origination, because of the ability to adapt the structure to the particular needs of
the borrower and its asset, . . . and in administration, because “bright line” tests
established for ongoing operations . . . provide both objective, predictable standards
for the borrower and administratively workable standards for the securitized lenders.
Id.
284. The success of the Japanese warrant program from 1987-1989, which gave foreign
investors the opportunity to invest in the Japanese stock market through purchases of Euroyen
securities with attached warrants, may suggest that Japanese ABS would find a wide reception
outside of Japan.  Interview with Stephen Wallenstein, Visiting Professor at Duke University
School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 6, 1998).
285. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 114, at 1424.
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2.  Investor Liquidity.286  Free transferability is one of the
cornerstones of capital markets.  Investors purchase securities with
the knowledge that a ready market exists in which to exchange
holdings for cash at will.  The ability to enter or exit the market freely
is generally termed “liquidity;” it greatly affects the pricing of
securities in the market.287  Liquidity is driven by volume.  That is, the
greater the number of players, the greater likelihood that a potential
buyer or seller exists to take the other side of a position.
The Japanese financial system has a history of being illiquid.288
This illiquidity has generally been the result of tight regulatory
restrictions designed to channel virtually all capital transactions
through banks or securities companies, ensuring governmental
control of all cash flows in and out of Japan.289  Moreover, due to its
recent inception, the ABS market in Japan does not yet possess a
high volume of buyers and sellers.  This, however, should not deter
originators from seeking to issue ABS, nor should it deter
prospective investors from purchasing them, the reason being that a
large-scale securitization program could itself create the necessary
liquidity needed to drive the market.
Liquidity could be created in two ways.  First, if Japanese banks,
dissolution agencies and nonbank entities issue a substantial number
of ABS backed by bad loans and market them to institutional
investors, the large volume of these buyers and sellers could create an
instantly liquid market for “jusen securities.”290  Second, launching a
large-scale securitization effort with the support of the government’s
ministries, such as the MOF and MITI, and employing the financial
muscle of large Japanese financial institutions, would signal to the
286. This section addresses investor-liquidity as opposed to issuer-liquidity.  Investor
liquidity relates to an investor’s ability to buy or sell in an open market, whereas issuer liquidity
relates to an issuer’s ability to generate cash flows sufficient to meet its obligations on the
issued securities.
287. See RADCLIFFE, supra note 136, at 193-97 (discussing the premium associated with
relatively illiquid investments); see also supra note 167 (defining liquidity).
288. See Wells & Thieme, supra note 178, at 44 (“[T]he relative illiquid nature of [Japan’s]
financial system [is] the result of historic regulatory restrictions on private capital
investments.”).
289. See id.
290. While liquidity for the bad loan-backed securities should not be a problem in the short-
term, if structures employed in jusen securitizations fail to produce the required cash flows to
fund the securities over the long-term, the market may experience a shortage of investors
willing to buy the securities from those wishing to exit.
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world the legal and financial viability of this financial tool in Japan.291
Foreign issuers of ABS would also benefit from having a market in
which to bring their securities, maximizing the global liquidity of
their issues.292
CONCLUSION
For financial institutions struggling through the current bad loan
crisis in Japan, the securitization of nonperforming loans could help
to create new and cheaper sources of funds, improve capital-to-asset
ratios and credit ratings, and enhance flexibility in dealing with
capital requirements.  As Japan begins to implement its Big Bang
deregulatory measures, more strategic Japanese-foreign alliances are
likely to arise and bring with them plans for securitizing Japanese
assets, including those of former jusen.  With the recent flurry of
securitization deals in Japan and the rest of Asia, the appetite for
innovative financial products is tremendous.  Investors would
embrace a large-scale ABS issuance that provides both substantial
liquidity and new avenues for portfolio diversification in the
Japanese capital markets.  Rather than calling on Japanese taxpayers
to fund the bad loan clean-up, the government should encourage the
securitization of nonperforming loans and collateral through legal
and regulatory changes.
291. See Profit in Jusen Loans, supra note 108 (suggesting that a securitization plan for
jusen debt would help popularize such financing in Japan).
292. See Park, supra note 89, at 734-35.
